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AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AND 
EVALUATING THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF EDUCATORS 
By Brett G. Scharffs *and fohn W. Welch** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The law, it seems, is of increasing concern to teachers and educators. 1 
A generation ago, teachers, administrators, schools, school districts, and 
universities seldom worried about being held legally liable for their 
actions or failures to act. This is no longer the case. In recent years, 
educators and educational institutions have been found legally liable for a 
variety of types of misconduct, in a wide range of contexts, and under 
several legal theories, including criminal law/ tort law,' sexual 
· Profe."m of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. ll.S.B.A., M.A. 
Gc·orgctown l;niversity; B. Phil Oxford University; j.D. Yale Law School. Copyright \<J Brett G. 
Sch,~rlls 2004. A version of this paper was presented at the Second Virginia Fducation Law 
Conference in Richmond Virginia in April 2004, and an abbreviated vcrs1on of this article was 
published as Brett (;. Scharffs and john W. Welch, Rcconceptrwlizing the Fiduciary Duties of 
Educators, Critical Issues in Education Law and Policy, Conference l'mceedings, Second Virginia 
hluo.:ation Law Conference, 99-118, LexisNexis (2004). We thank Richard \'acca, Marti Collier, and 
their colleagues at Virginia Commonwealth University li>r the oppo~tunity to present our research in 
that forum, and gratefully acknowledge LexisNexis for copyright permission to include materials 
from that article. We thank Betsy l'owlcr, Ryan Morris, Rebekah Clark, and Kelley ,\1arsden l·nr their 
helpful research assistance. 
•· Robert K. Thomas Professor of Law,). Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University B.A., 
M.A. Brigham Young University; Lit. Hum. Oxford University; j.D. Duke Law School. Copyright :u 
john W. Welch 2004 
I. Sec Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Wclwmc to Sue City, U.S.A., U.S. News & World Rpt. M, 
june 16, 2003; Mark Carpenter, "Education Not Litigation: The Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Liability 
Protection Act of 200 I," http:/ /www.cse.org/in!(mned/pdf__filcs/ cc293 _·1 'eacher_Protection __ Act.pdf 
(,\larch 21, 2001) ("[T]eachers are becoming more and more concerned each school year with the 
threat of lawsuits. In tiKt, a survey by the American l'ederation of Teachers shows that liability 
protection ranks ;.unong the top three concerns leachcrs want their unions to addrc.'.,...,."); Jes:-.ica 
Portner, Fear/ill Teachers Huy Lia/Ji/ity Insurance, Education Week (March 29, 2000) (showing that 
the number of teachers purchasing liability insurance increased twenty-five percent between 1995 
and 2000). 
2. Sec e.g Stale v. Clay, 2005 WL l?SI:\5 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. jan. 5, 2005) (upholding the 
gross sexual imposition conviction of a driver's education teacher who l(,ndlcd students who were 
fitieen and a half years old); State v. Hainey, 2003 WL 21302993 (Tenn. Crim. App. june 6, 2003) 
(upholding the conviction of a principal, who also served as the girl's basketball coach, on seven 
counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and eleven counts of statutory rape f(>r his sexual 
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harassment statutes,4 contract law,5 "educational malpractice,"6 and 
recently under the vague and uncertain equitable concept of fiduciary 
duty. 7 
While there is nothing new about teachers, administrators, and 
schools thinking about their relationships with students and parents as 
deeply infused with responsibilities and obligations, historically these 
duties were not thought of in overtly legal terms.x Now, however, a 
number of courts and commentators have suggested that the student-
teacher relationship is a fiduciary relationship, carrying legal obligations 
and potential liability for misconduct. 9 
This article addresses two related questions. First, to what extent and 
under what circumstances does it make sense to characterize and treat 
the relationship of students with teachers, administrators, and 
educational institutions as a fiduciary relationship with legally enforced 
duties? Second, under what circumstances are teachers and educational 
institutions more or less likely to be considered to have breached a 
relationship with a tenth grade student). 
3. See Hubbard v. Canton City Sch. Bd. o(Educ., 780 N.E.2d 543, 547 (Ohio 2002) (holding 
that a city school board of education was not immune from liability on negligent retention and 
supervision claim asserted by parent of middle school students in connection with alleged sexual 
assaults on those students by a teacher on school premises); Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (fla. 
1982) (holding that a school could be liable f{>r a tort committed by a student on the school grounds). 
4. See e.g. Mandsagcr v. U. of N. C., 269 f. Supp. 2d 662, 678-79 (M.ll.N.C:. 2003) (holding 
that graduate student alleged sufficient facts to establish university's liability l(>r subjecting her to a 
sexually '""tile environment resulting hom professor's sexual harassment). 
5. See e.g. Peretti v. Montana, 464 f. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979) (analyzing duties 
between college and students under rubric of contract law, and noting that "the general nature and 
terms of the agreement are usually implied, with specific terms to be fillmd in the university bulletin 
and other publications; custom and usages can also become specific terms by implication"), rcv'd, 
661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1981) (the case was reversed on a provivion of Montana\ Constitution 
regarding a waiver of immunity, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the contract chum). 
6. A majority of states do not recognize a cause of action fi>r "educational malpractice." Kent 
Weeks and Rich Haglund, Fiduciary Duties of College and University Faculty and Administrators, 29 
].C. & U.l.. 153, 156 (2002). See e.g. Ross v. Creighton University, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting student athlete's claim that the university committed malpractice by f<liling to provide a 
meaningful education and prepare him f(>r employment). 
7. See Chou v. U. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. 
Supp. 2d <JO (Conn. 2000). 
8. This trend towards seeking juriscentric solutions to a wide range of social problems and 
frictions is in no way unique to the educational setting. Many commentators have expressed concern 
about the trend towards seeking legal solutions to every type of problem in every type of relationship. 
Sec Zuckerman, supra n. 1; Philip K. Howard, The Collapse of the C.o11lrnon Good: How America's 
Lawsuit Culture Undermines Our Freedom (Ballantine 2002); Philip K. Howard, !Jeuth of Common 
Sense: How Law Is Suffocating America (G.K. Hall & Co. 1995). 
9. Sec generally Melissa Astala, Wronged by a Professor' Breach of" Fiduciary IJuty as a 
Remedy in Intellectual Property Cases, 3 Houston Bus. & Tax!..]. 31 (2003); Ro/Jert P. Schuwerk, The 
Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to Our Students, 45 S. !'ex. I.. Rev. 753 (20tl4): 
Weeks & Haglund, supra n. ti. 
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fiduciary duty? 
In Part II of this study we will discuss the concept of fiduciary duty, 
the range of relationships to which this idea applies, and the doctrinal 
approaches usually taken in analyzing alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. 
We argue that while these doctrinal approaches are important, they are 
remarkably unhelpful in providing guidance in assessing and predicting 
the circumstances in which a court will find that there has been a breach 
of fiduciary duty. In Part III we introduce and develop a new framework 
for assessing the likelihood that a court will find a fiduciary duty to exist, 
and whether there has been a breach of that duty. This new analytic 
framework focuses upon a number of factors that courts use in a wide 
array of situations and relationships to assess first, whether a fiduciary 
relationship exists and if so whether the magnitude of duty owed by a 
particular fiduciary to a particular beneficiary is relatively large or small, 
and second, whether the magnitude of an alleged breach is large or small. 
In Part IV we apply this new framework for assessing the magnitude of 
duties and breaches to four areas in which courts have been asked to hold 
teachers or educational institutions liable as fiduciaries: (i) the evaluation 
and grading of students; (ii) professor-student research relationships; (iii) 
patents and other intellectual property; and (iv) sexual harassment. We 
conclude in Part V that teachers, educational institutions, attorneys, and 
courts will be able to assess alleged violations of fiduciary duty more 
effectively by applying this analytical framework to asserted violations of 
fiduciary duty. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
A. What It Means to Be a Fiduciary 
Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiduciary as "one who owes to 
another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor." 10 The 
word "fiduciary" stems from several Latin terms, including fides, 11 or 
faith, 12 which represented the conscience of the people, their morals,n 
10. Black's Law Dictionary640 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed., West 1999) [hereinafter Black's]. 
II. David Cowan Bayne, The Philosophy of Corporate Control: A Treatise on the Law of 
Fiduciary lJuty 36 (Loyola U. Press 1986); The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 380 (Robert K. 
Barnhart ed., H.W. Wilson 1988) [hereinafter Barnhart]; The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 
354 (C.T. Onions ed., Oxford U. Press 1966) [hereinafter Oxford]. 
12. Black's, supra n. 10, at 640; see also Barnhart, supra n. II, at 380; Bayne, supra n. 11, at 36; 
Oxford, supra note II, at 354. 
13. Hans Julius Woltl~ }(oman Law: An Historical Introduction 65, 74-75 (U. of Okla. Press 
1951 ). 
1LVVJ 
and their trust or confidence, 14 and the term fiducia, 15 meaning a 
"position of trust," 16 or "in trust." 17 While rooted in concepts such as 
good faith, trust, and confidence, the duties that courts have categorized 
under the rubric of fiduciary duty are many and varied, and are often 
described in very lofty terms. These duties include the duty not to 
commit fraud, not to engage in self-dealing, to be loyal, obedient, 
diligent, and exercise good faith, to disclose material information, and to 
exercise care and prudence, among others. 
For example, in perhaps the most well-known case ever decided 
about fiduciary duty, Meinhard v. Salmon, Judge Cardozo explained: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those 
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A 
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. 
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition 
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been 
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule 
of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular 
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept 
at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously 
be lowered by any judgment of this court. 1H 
While courts often resort to strongly normative language in 
describing fiduciary duties, in practice they are often much less 
demanding in the degree of selflessness and competence required of 
fiduciaries than their rhetoric would suggest. For example, in the 
Meinhard case, Judge Cardozo suggests that the managing coadventurer 
might have fulfilled his fiduciary duties merely by disclosing a business 
opportunity to his co-adventurer, and then letting him compete for it. 1Y 
As a further example, in the case of directors of corporations, the 
14. Rayne, supra n. 11, at 36-37. 
15. Barnhart, supra n. 11, at 3HO; Bayne, supra 11. II, at 36; Oxf(lrd, supra 11. 11, at 354; Frnest 
Vinter, A Treatise on the History and Law of Fiduciary l<clationship m1d l<csulting Trusts I (3d ed., 
Cambridge 1955). 
16. Vi11ter, supra n. 15, at 1. 
I 7. Sec e.g. id. 
JR. A1einhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,547 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted). 
19. Td at 547 ("[Salmon]might have warned Mcinhard that the plan had been submitted, and 
that either would be free to compete f(Jr the award. If he had done this, we do not need to say 
whether he would have been under a duty, if successful in the competition, to hold the lease so 
acquired for the benefit of a venture than about to end, and thus prolong by indirection ih 
responsibilities and duties. The trouble about his conduct is that he excluded his coadventurer from 
any chance to compete .... "). A duty to disclose and compete, however, would appear to be much 
less demanding than Cardozo's earlier rhetoric (a "duty of the finest loyalty," a "punctilio oC an 
honor the most sensitive," and "undivided loyalty") might lead one to believe. 
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business judgment rule provides a presumption that directors act 
honestly, in good faith, and in an informed manner that is in the best 
interests of the corporation, 20 which creates a safe harbor that may shield 
directors from judgments that are mistaken,21 or even egregiously 
stupid.22 Thus, focusing on the morally charged language employed by 
judges in discussing fiduciary duties can create a misleading impression 
that all fiduciaries owe high magnitude duties in all situations, and that 
all fiduciaries will be held fully liable for the consequences of even low 
magnitude breaches of duty. The reality is much more complicated, as 
cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by educators bear out. 
B. Fiduciary Relationships and Duties 
Fiduciary duty is a concept that applies to a large variety of 
relationships in almost every imaginable precinct of law and life, 
including a trustee and beneficiary, a guardian and ward, an agent and 
principal, a lawyer and client, a member of the clergy and a parishioner, a 
director and a corporation, a partner and the other partners, an employer 
and an employee, and a broker and client. Indeed, the number of 
potential fiduciary relationships is continuously expanding/3 and today 
sometimes includes the relationship of teachers, educators, and 
educational institutions and their students. 
The concept is further complicated by the fact that fiduciary duties 
arise under a broad array of laws, including a variety of federal statutes, 
state statutes, and the common law. Add to this the literally thousands of 
cases decided by courts involving alleged violations of fiduciary duty, and 
the law of fiduciary duty is by any measure an exceedingly complex and 
nuanced area of the law. 
C. Teachers and Educators as Fiduciaries 
Historically, the association of teachers and their students has been 
viewed as a fiduciary relationship. 24 Over the past thirty years, however, 
20. See e.g. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. I 'IR4). 
21. See e.g. Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (S. Ct. 1'176), af(d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 
9'13 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1'176). 
22. See hz re Caremark Inti. Inc. Derivative Litig., 6'18 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1 '196) 
("[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively 
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational,' provides no 
ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process empl0yed was either 
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.") 
23. Bennet v. Hodge, 29 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 1940); Studybaker v. Cofield, 61 S.W.2d 246, 250 
(Mo. 1901); Peckham v. johnson, 98 S.W.2d 408,416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); see also Ceorge c;lcason 
Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees§ 7, 29 (2d ed., West 1984). 
24. See e.g. Warren A. Seavey, Dismissal of Students; "Due Process", 70 Haz-v. 1.. J(cv. 1406, 
lV~ D.l.U. LL/U1.._.,l""LL1V1'< ~i'<LI L~ VV JVUK!'<~L ]LVV:J 
the pendulum, given momentum by cor~cern for student privacy and 
free-speech rights, swung dramatically towards viewing this relationship 
as one defined by rights (primarily of students) rather than duties.2 ~ In 
recent years, fueled perhaps by the events of Columbine and other high-
profile incidents, the pendulum has begun to swing back towards viewing 
the relationship as a trust concept defined by duties (of teachers and 
schools), as well as rights. It seems likely that the concept of fiduciary 
duty will play a growing role in the legal and moral assessment of 
educational relationships in the future. 
Courts and commentators have identified a wide variety of fiduciary 
duties that teachers and educational institutions might owe to students, 
including a duty to provide an educational environment free of sexual 
harassment,26 duties arising from the services provided by a university's 
faculty and staff as advisors to undergraduate students,27 and duties 
governing the conduct of dissertation advisers and committees towards 
graduate students.2x 
D. The Doctrinal Approaches to Analyzing Fiduciary Duties 
The usual approach employed by U.S. courts and commentators for 
analyzing fiduciary duties focuses upon established doctrines and 
concepts. In its most basic form, the doctrinal approach first asks 
whether someone is a fiduciary, and if so who the beneficiaries of that 
fiduciary's duties are. Thus, the threshold question is whether or not a 
fiduciary relationship exists. In order for there to be a fiduciary 
relationship, there must be an element of entrustment by one person (the 
J 407 n. 3 ( J 957) ("Since schools exist primarily for the education of their students, it is obvious that 
professors cmd administrators act in a fiduciary capacity with reference to the students."). 
25. Sec Tinker v. Des Moines lndcp. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 ( 1969) ("It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
nr expression at the schoolhouse gate."). Tinker significantly undermined the historic authority of 
schools, administrators, and teachers to make and enforce rules controlling student behavior. See 
Kelly Frels, Balancing Students' Rights and Schools' Responsibilities, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 117, 119-20 
{2000). In the 1970s, Tinker provided the foundation for several cases regarding students' rights, 
including the right to distribute literature on campus, see e.g Trachtman v. Anker, 563 1'.2d 512,516 
(2d Cir. 1977); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); to use 
"indecent speech" in school newspapers and at student assemblies, see Pap ish v. Bd. of' Curators, 410 
U.S. 667, 671 (1973); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 47R U.S. 675 ( 19R6); Pap ish v. Bd. of 
Curators, 410 U.S. 667,670 (1973); to wear long hair, see e.g. Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 7R3 (4th 
Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d !On9, 1075 (Rth Cir. 1971), to boycott and skip classes, sec e.g. 
Dunn v. Tyler lndep. Sch. Dist., 460 F.2d 137, 146-47 (5th C:ir. 1972), and to hold demonstrations on 
school grounds during the school day, see e.g. Pickens v. Okolona Mun. Separate Sch. Dis I., 594 F.2d 
433,437 (5th Cor. 1979); see Frels, supra n. 25, at 120-21. 
26. Weeks & Haglund, supra n. 6, at 154. 
27. Id. 
2H. Jd. 
159] FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF EDUCATORS 165 
beneficiary) to another (the fiduciary), an element of power and control 
by the fiduciary over the interests and well-being of the beneficiary, and 
an element of proactivity and protection where under the fiduciary 
subordinates her own interests in order to pursue and protect the 
interests of the beneficiary. 
If a fiduciary relationship exists, the doctrinal approach then asks (i) 
what duties the fiduciary owes to the beneficiaries (e.g., duty of loyalty, 
duty of care, duty of disclosure); and (ii) whether the fiduciary has 
breached any of those duties (e.g., through a conflict of interest, gross 
negligence, or failure to disclose material information). 
With so many relationships characterized as fiduciary relationships, 
and with so many distinctly identifiable fiduciary duties, it may be 
surprising that courts are not more aggressive in finding breaches of 
fiduciary duty. But fiduciary concepts apply in different ways in different 
areas of the law and in different situations within a particular area of the 
law. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, "To say that a man is 
a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To 
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?" 2Y 
Enquiries about alleged breaches of fiduciary duty involve highly detailed 
factual analyses of a wide array of factors that affect the magnitude of 
duty and magnitude of breach in a given situation. 
E. The Inadequacy of Traditional Doctrinal Approaches 
The formulaic application of doctrinal categories often does as much 
to obfuscate as it does to illuminate the likely outcome of a particular 
case. Doctrinal approaches, while valuable, often do not seem to give 
much guidance as to whether or not liability will result from an alleged 
breach of duty. In the educational context, for example, sometimes courts 
conclude that the relationship between a teacher and a student is a 
fiduciary relationship, 311 and sometimes courts conclude that it is not a 
fiduciary relationship. 31 In addition, at times a court will conclude that 
specific behavior constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, while another 
court will conclude that apparently very similar behavior is not a breach 
of fiduciary duty. 32 It is tempting to throw up one's arms in despair at 
29. Securities and Exch. Commn. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (l 943). 
30. See Chou v. U. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 
90 (Conn. 2000). 
31. Andre v. Pace U., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1996); Ho v. U. of Tex. at 
Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. 7th Dist. 1998); Maas v. Corp. of Gonzaga U., 618 P.2d 106, 
108 (Wash. App. Div. 3 1'!80). 
32. Compare Chou, 254 F.3d at 1347 with U. of' W. Va. v. Van Voorhies, 278 F.3d 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
V._l_.\....1, .LJ.L/\....I...._.,.il_.L_l_'-./_l"' _.i_l__l"'..L/ L.il_YY )'--/\....11'\..l_"'.l_l_.l_.; 
finding any rhyme or reason to the myriad of cases with conflicting and 
difficult to reconcile results. Such a temptation, however, should be 
resisted, at least unless we really are certain that there are no underlying 
organizing principles that operate in this area of the law. 
Focusing exclusively upon whether a fiduciary relationship exists, 
and whether a particular duty has been breached is often not particularly 
helpful in trying to determine whether a court is likely to find that there 
has been an actionable breach of fiduciary duty. As Arthur R. Pinto and 
Douglas M. Branson explain, "While [fiduciary] duty is described in 
terms of these two categories of care and loyalty, there is in fact a sliding 
scale of duty because some cases fall between those duties. As the 
[Delaware l Supreme Court indicated in Guth v. Loft, fiduciary duty is 
subject to "no fixed scale."33 
III. AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE MAGNITUDE OF 
DUTIES AND BREACHES 
An analysis of cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in a 
broad array of relationships and in many areas of the law reveals that the 
law in practice, if not always in doctrine, has an extremely nuanced, 
subtle, and sophisticated approach to evaluating claims of breach of 
fiduciary duty. 34 Courts in nearly every imaginable jurisdiction have 
decided numerous cases concerning fiduciary duty/" including a 
surprisingly large number of cases that assess the claim that teachers or 
educational institutions have violated a fiduciary duty.'" Collectively, a 
close reading of cases alleging breaches of fiduciary duty suggests that 
there are perhaps as many as thirty factors that courts routinely take into 
account when determining whether the particular duties owed by a 
fiduciary in a particular situation are of a high or low magnitude, and 
whether there has been a breach of fiduciary duty, and if so whether that 
breach is large or small. While courts' consideration of these factors is by 
no means systematic, a study of numerous cases involving a wide variety 
33. Arthur R. Pinto and Douglas M. Branson, Understanding Corporate Law 182 (LexisNexis 
1999) (quoting Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1961)). 
34. We are working on an article about quantifying the magnitude of fiduciary duties and 
their breach in a wide array of fiduciary relationships. A draft of the article, tentatively titled, "A 
General Theory of Fiduciary Relativity," is on file with the authors. 
35. For example, in a Westlaw search of the fifty state courts in the United States, the phrase 
"fiduciary duty" appears in over 27,400 cases. Search of Westlaw, ALI.STATES database (Jan. 17, 
2005). 
36. In the same directory, over 550 cases include the phrase "fiduciary duty" in the same 
paragraph with words like teacher, educator, school, university, or professor. Search of 'vV cstlaw, 
At.ISTATFS database (Jan. 17, 2005). 
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of types of fiduciary relationships in a wide variety of contexts reveals a 
number of criteria and considerations that courts predictably and 
regularly utilize. 
We propose that in determining the likelihood of legal liability for an 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty, one should engage in three inter-related 
enquiries. (l) The first enquiry involves considering and analyzing a set 
of f~lCtors and indicia to determine whether a fiduciary relationship 
between two parties exists and, more importantly, the magnitude of duty 
that arises within that particular relationship and context. 37 Such an 
enquiry helps determine whether a fiduciary in a particular situation 
owes a relatively high or relatively low degree of duty. (2) The second 
enquiry involves analyzing a related set of factors and indicia that will 
help determine the height or degree of the fiduciary's behavior. (3) The 
third step is to measure the amplitude of the fiduciary's performance to 
determine the extent to which that conduct exceeded or fell short of the 
required level of performance.'x If there has been a shortfall or breach of 
duty, this enquiry then determines the amount or type of appropriate 
remedies. This step also considers how easy or difficult it would have 
been for the fiduciary to fulfill his or her duty, whether there are any 
special reasons why a court should not get involved in second guessing 
the fiduciary or substituting its judgment for that of the fiduciary, and 
whether there is an available remedy that would be appropriate in 
rectifying or at least ameliorating the effects of the breach of duty. 39 
This approach to analyzing fiduciary duties is helpful in several ways. 
It inherently recognizes that all fiduciary duties are not created equal, and 
that all breaches will not be regarded as equally harmful. 411 For example, 
by conducting this type of analysis we learn that courts are most likely to 
find liability in cases involving duties of a high magnitude coupled with 
breaches of a high magnitude and where there is an available appropriate 
remedy. Conversely, if a low-degree duty is coupled with a low-degree 
breach and there is no remedy that seems appropriate for the situation, 
courts are unlikely to impose legal liability. Cases involving a high degree 
of duty and a low degree breach, or cases involving a low degree duty and 
a serious breach prove to be the most difficult situations in which to 
)/ Infra, Part II I.A . 
. >H. ln/m, Part II I. B . 
. W Inji-a, Part IILC. 
·10. As Arthur R. Pinto and Douglas M. Branson explain, "While [fiduciary] duty is described 
in terms of [the] categories oi care and loyalty, there is in fact a sliding scale of duty because some 
cases t1ll between those duties. As the [Delaware] Supreme Court indicated in the Guth case 
iiduciary duty is subject to 'no fixed scale."' Arthur R. Pinto and Douglas M. Branson, 
Understanding Corporate J.aw I H2 (LexisNexis I'!'!'!) (quoting Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1%1)) 
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predict outcomes; but even in such cases, the approach outlined below 
allows lawyers, judges, and litigants to identify and produce all the 
evidence systematically relevant to a sound resolution of the case. In all 
cases, this approach identifies specific, quantifiable elements that allow 
judges, lawyers, and administrators to marshal the evidence and make 
reasonable judgments in calculating the magnitude of duty owed and the 
degree of violation of duty that may have occurred. 
This analytical approach is also helpful in answering important 
doctrinal questions such as: What standard of review should a court 
apply to an alleged breach? Which party should bear the burden of 
proof? If there is a high magnitude duty, then a court is more likely to 
require defendants to bear the burden of proof that their performance 
was satisfactory. On the other hand, if the magnitude of duty is relatively 
low, courts will be more likely to require the plaintiff to bear the burden 
of proof. In determining the proper standard of review, if there is a large 
breach, it is unlikely that a strong presumption of propriety (such as that 
afforded by the business judgment rule) in favor of the fiduciary will 
apply. On the other hand, if there is only a small alleged breach, the 
plaintiff will more likely be required to bear the burden of proof before 
liability will be found. 
This analytic framework is useful in evaluating a broad array of 
fiduciary relationships and is particularly helpful in the complex and 
multifaceted area of evaluating alleged breaches of duty by teachers and 
educators. Without such a framework, the cases may seem confusing or 
inconsistent since an overly simplistic application of doctrines such as 
"duty of care" and "duty of loyalty" may result in outcomes that are 
difficult to explain or reconcile with other decisions. When the 
underlying questions of magnitude of duty and magnitude of breach are 
considered, however, an underlying consistency and coherence in the 
decisions begins to come into focus, albeit of an imperfect and sometimes 
contestable nature. 
As is the case in each unique context, some of the factors that 
contribute to an analysis of the magnitude of duties and the magnitude of 
breaches are of particular significance in the educational setting. For 
example, in assessing magnitude of duties and breaches in the 
educational context, the following considerations are often important: 
the degree of actual power or control entrusted to the fiduciary, the age 
and vulnerability of the beneficiary, the experience and sophistication of 
both the fiduciary and the beneficiary, the formality in the creation of the 
agreement between the fiduciary and beneficiary, the history and 
duration of the relationship, the degree and cause of reliance in a 
relationship, the divergence of interests between the fiduciary and 
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beneficiary, and the specificity of duty, among others. 
The following section outlines the main factors and considerations 
that courts take into account in determining (A) the magnitude of duty, 
and (B) the magnitude of an alleged breach. Each of these many factors 
and considerations can become pertinent in any given case. Before 
turning to the application of these factors in educational settings, this 
section will also consider briefly (C) the availability and formulation of 
appropriate remedies. 
A. Quantifying the Magnitude of Duty Owed 
After determining that there is prima facie evidence that a fiduciary 
relationship exists,41 the first step in analyzing an alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty should be to quantify the magnitude of duty that exists in a 
particular case or situation. Four broad considerations are relevant to a 
determination of whether a relatively high or relatively low degree of 
duty is owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary: (1) the characteristics of 
the parties, both the fiduciary and the beneficiary in absolute as well as 
relative terms; (2) the characteristics of the relationship between the 
fiduciaries and beneficiaries; (3) the characteristics of the subject matter 
of the alleged breach, including the significance of the event in question, 
the value of the entrustment at stake, and the public importance of the 
matter; and ( 4) the underlying source of the legal action. Many of these 
considerations exist on a continuum, with one end of the continuum 
corresponding to a higher degree of duty and the other end of the 
continuum corresponding to a lower degree of duty. 
1. Characteristics of the Parties 
The first group of factors in quantifying the magnitude of duty that a 
fiduciary owes a beneficiary relate to the respective characteristics of the 
parties. These characteristics are significant both in an absolute sense, 
and when comparing the relative characteristics of the fiduciary and 
beneficiary. 
a. The Fiduciary 
A number of characteristics of fiduciaries themselves are relevant to 
determining the degree of duty to which the fiduciary will be held. Most 
41. Prima facie evidence that a fiduciary relationship exists will be based upon a 
determination that there has been an element of entrustment by one person (the beneficiary) to 
another (the t!duciary), an clement of power and control by the fiduciary over the interests and well-
being of the beneficiary, and an element of proactivity and protection under which the fiduciary 
subordinates her own interests in order to pursue and protect the interests of the beneficiary. 
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Similarly, if an alleged breach of duty takes place within a sphere 
of conduct where a fiduciary has a high degree of power and 
control, it is more likely that a high degree of duty will be 
found. 50 On the other hand, fiduciaries with relatively little 
power are subject to comparatively lower degrees of duty. A 
teacher or educator with a high degree of actual power or control 
over a student will more likely be found to have a high degree of 
duty. 51 In contrast, if a teacher has relatively little control over a 
student, or is closely supervised and has little control over 
curricular and other choices, and is acting within the scope of his 
authority, it is more likely that he will be held to a lower degree 
of duty. 
• Degree of Delegated Fiduciary Discretion: (high, medium, low). 
Closely related to power is discretion, which also exists on a 
continuum. A fiduciary who has a high degree of discretion in 
how he performs is more likely to be deemed to have a relatively 
high magnitude of duty. 52 In contrast, a fiduciary who operates in 
Ill. Dec 23, 2003) ("The common law imposes [a fiduciary duty] when the disparity between the 
parties in knowledge or power relevant to the performance of an undertaking is so vast that it is a 
reasonable inference that had the parties in advance negotiated expressly over the issue they would 
have agreed thai the agent owed the principal the high duty that we have dc,cribcd, because 
otherwise the principal would be placing himself at the agent's mercy." (citing Burdett v. Millrr, 957 
F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992))); In re Tramco/or Corp., 296 B.R. 343, 372 (Bankr. D. Md. 2003) 
("As the party in control of both Alleco and Tramcolor, Lapides owed a fiduciary duty to NCB as 
trustee"); D'Addario v. Geller, 264 !'. Supp. 2d 367, 395 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("[l]t appears clear to the 
court that Florida state law imposes a fiduciary duty on corporate officers who control the 
corporation through ownership of a majority of the stock." (citing Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 
2d 618, 619 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1981))). In contrast, if a fiduciary has a relatively low amount of 
actual power or control, it is less likely that he will be found in breach of a tlduciary duty. Baker v. 
Kingsley, 294 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that certain Management Committee 
members were not fiduciaries as to a funding plan because of a lack of power or control "with respect 
to the investment of the plan's assets or the plan's funding"), rev'd and remanded, F.3d 649,664 (7th 
Cir. 2004); In re Estate of King, 2003 WL 21946723 at '2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. II, 2003) (finding that 
an executor and benet!ciary of a will did not have sufficient power or control over the decedent to 
give rise to a fiduciary duty). 
50. Vikell Investors Panjic, Inc. v. Hampden, Ltd., 946 P.2d 589, 596-597 (Colo. App. 1997) 
("A fiduciary relationship generally arises when one party has a high degree of control over the 
property or subject matter of another, when the benefiting party places a high level of trust and 
cont!dcnce in the fiduciary to look out for the beneficiary's best interest, or when one party relies on 
another's high degree of expertise in an area.") (citing Hailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 1336, 1339 
(Colo. App. 1992). 
51. See e.g. Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 1'. Supp. 2d 90, 97 (D. Conn. 2000) (denying a motion to 
dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim, brought by a graduate student against his dissertation 
advisors and Yale University for misappropriating his dissertation ideas, on the basis that a fiduciary 
relationship might be established since the advisors and the university were "in a position of power 
and authority" over him). 
52. See McAdams v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 287, 303 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[T]he 
question of whether one party owes fiduciary duties to another is a question of fact. [A] [k]ey 
factor ... in this fact-specific inquiry include\s] ... whether one party has granted another party a 
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a tightly bounded environment with little discretion will more 
likely be found to have a relatively low magnitude of duty. We 
would expect that the degree of discretion that a teacher or 
educator enjoys would have a predictable effect on the 
magnitude of duty that such a teacher or educator will be 
deemed to have. 
Dominance of One Fiduciary Over Other Fiduciaries: (high, 
medium, low). Sometimes fiduciaries act as a group, such as the 
board of directors of a corporation. In such a situation, if a 
particular fiduciary among a group of fiduciaries exerts a 
dominant influence over the others, it is common for that 
fiduciary to be held to have a relatively higher degree of duty. 53 In 
contrast, a fiduciary who is dominated rather than the dominator 
may be held to have a lower degree of duty, although such a 
fiduciary will not be absolved from all duty and will not be 
allowed to cite alleged powerlessness as an excuse for abject 
failures or abdications of duty. We would expect in the 
educational context as well, that a fiduciary, such as a powerful 
school administrator or department chair, who dominates other 
fiduciaries will be held to have a higher degree of duty. 
• Amount of Compensation Received by Fiduciary: (high, 
medium, low, none). As a general rule, highly compensated 
fiduciaries are likely to be deemed to have a comparatively 
greater degree of duty than fiduciaries who receive no significant 
monetary compensation. 54 Even fiduciaries who are not paid at 
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great deal of discretion.") (citation omitted); U.S. v. Britt, 388 F3d 1369, 1372 (lith Cir. 2004) 
(holding that because of her broad discretion and loose supervision, a part-time clerk with the Social 
Security Administration had a fiduciary relationship necessary to find an abuse of a position of 
trust); Ohio Civ. Serv. Employees Assn., AFSCME Local 11, AFL-CIO v. St. Empl. Relations Bd., 759 
N.F.. 2d 794, 798~799 (Ohio App. lOth Dist. 2001) ("the authority to make discretionary investment 
and banking decisions shows a 'highly fiduciary' relationship." (citing State ex ref Charlton v. 
Corrigan, 521 N.E.2d 804 (Ohio 1988))); Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1'J71) 
(finding that trustees who had considerable discretion to manage the trust breached the fiduciary 
obligation to maximize trust income by prudent investment); see also In re Enron Corp., 2003 WL 
1562202 at '16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2003) (recognizing that "the authority to usc estate 
property in the ordinary course of business confers upon the debtor the corresponding discretion to 
exercise reasonable judgment in ordinary affairs bounded only the debtor's fiduciary duties"). 
53. See e.g. In re Abrams, 229 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 1999) ("'n reviewing the line 
of cases that gave rise to the rule in Texas that the managing partner of a partnership owes to his 
copartners the highest fiduciary obligations known at law, it is clear that the issue of control has 
always heen the critical fact looked to by the courts in imposing this high level of responsibility." 
(citing In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779, 789 (5th Cir. 1993))); Hujji11gton v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576, 
579 (Tex. 1976) (holding that a managing partner "owed to his copartners one of the highest 
fiduciaries recognized in the law" and quoting justice Cardozo's comments concerning managing 
fiduciaries in Mei11hard v. Salmon, 164 1\:.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) where he stated that '"[flor [managing 
coadventurers] the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme"'). 
54. See Zimmer Paper Products, Inc. v. Berger & Montague, 758 F.2d 86, 97 (3d Cir. I 985) 
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all, however, may be viewed as having violated their fiduciary 
duties, especially if there are other indicia that suggest a relatively 
high magnitude duty or high magnitude breach. The level of 
compensation of a teacher, professor, educator, or administrator 
will likely be a relevant factor in determining the degree of duty 
to which the individual will be held. We would also expect as a 
general matter that volunteers in an educational setting will be 
held to a lower degree of duty than paid professionals. 
• Other Roles of Fiduciary: (full-time, part-time). If a fiduciary 
serves in a full-time capacity, it is more likely she will be held to a 
high degree of duty. 55 In contrast, if a fiduciary has a host of 
unrelated responsibilities, interests, or opportunities, a lower 
degree of duty may be applied.56 We would expect this general 
consideration to apply in the educational context in a similar 
way, with full-time educational professionals being held to a 
higher degree of duty than part-time employees. 
(Wcis, J., dissenting) (arguing that lawyers who did not give adequate notice of an antitrust class 
action settlement "were not only fiduciaries, but well compensated ones as well") (majority did not 
look at amount of compensation and found they did not breach any fiduciary relationship); In rc Est. 
of Maurice, 249 A.2d 334, 336 (Pa. 1969) (finding that beneficiaries had grounds t()r their claim of 
surcharge against the executor who had overpaid taxes, because "[ijt is only reasonable and logical to 
expect that services so well compensated for should have been performed in a careful and skillful 
manner") (emphasis added); Compare with Sweickley Township Volunteer Fire Co. No.3 v. First Nat'/ 
Bank of Herminie, 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th 297, 299-300 (Pa. Com. Pleas Ct. 1990) (finding that volunteer 
fire fighters did not have a fiduciary duty as there is a lower standard for "people like the officers and 
directors of a non-protlt fire company, who serve the public without compensation and who, 
therefore, should not be held to the same standard as those who serve profit-making entities and 
derive remuneration for their services."). Some courts aftlrmatively reject the suggestion that 
compensation should be a factor in assessing magnitude of duty. See e.g. Matter of Neuschwander, 
747 P.2d 104, 106 (Kan. 1987) ("The fact that [the non-profit corporation's] directors and officers 
served as volunteers without compensation does not reduce the fiduciary duty owed to the 
corporation."); Atty. Grievance Commn. v. Silk, 369 A.2d 70, 71 (Md. 1977) ("[T]here appears to be 
no sound reason for regarding misappropriations committed in a non-professional capacity more 
leniently than those committed in a professional capacity. Each involves a breach of trust or of a 
fiduciary relationship and bear equally on the fitness of a lawyer to practice his profession."). 
55. See T.A. Pelsue Co. v. Grand Enters., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 147o, 1486-1487 (D. Colo. 1991) 
(finding and emphasizing that a former, "full-time" employee violated his fiduciary duty by 
competing with his f(Jrmer employer). 
56. Sec e.g. BEP, Inc. v. Atkinson, 174 F. Supp. 2d 400, 409 (D. Md. 2001) (finding defendant 
"was merely a part time employee and owed no fiduciary duty by competing with his former 
employer"); Sweickley Township Vol. Fire Co. No.3 v. First Nat/. Rank ofHerminie, 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th 
297, 299-300 (Pa. Com. Pleas Ct. 1990) (finding that volunteer fire fighters did not breach any 
fiduciary duty); but see U.S. v. Britt, 388 F.3d 1369, 1370 (II th Cir. 2004) (rejecting defendant's 
argument that her part-time status as a clerk for the Social Security Administration excluded her 
from a fiduciary relationship, on the basis that her high degree of discretion and loose supervision 
was suftlcient to place her in a position of trust). 
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(b) The Beneficiary 
Characteristics of the beneficiary are also relevant to determining the 
degree of duty that a fiduciary will owe a beneficiary. Courts often focus 
upon the following characteristics: 
Number and Uniqueness of Beneficiaries: (large, medium, 
small). In general, if there is a large number of beneficiaries, such 
as in a large public corporation, fiduciaries will have a relatively 
high degree of duty. ' 7 If, however, the number of beneficiaries is 
small, but their needs are great or distinctive, then the fact that a 
fiduciary fails to tailor his services to those needs may also be 
relevant to an assessment of degree of duty. In the education 
context, we would expect the number of beneficiaries to be quite 
a complex factor in evaluating the magnitude of duty. A teacher 
of a small class of students for whom that teacher has primary 
responsibility might be held to a relatively high degree of duty, 
while a teacher who has less exposure to a much larger number 
of students might have a lower degree of duty. On the other 
hand, the expectations of an administrator who is responsible for 
a large school or district might be higher than those of an 
administrator with a smaller stewardship. 
Age of Beneficiaries: (aged, adult, young adult, adolescent, 
minor children, infants). The age of beneficiaries is also often a 
factor in assessing the degree of duty, particularly when the 
number of beneficiaries is relatively small and the similarities 
<Among the beneficiaries is high. Duties owed to inLmts, minor 
children, adolescents, young adults, adults, aged, and the infirm 
will vary according to the needs and capacities of the 
beneficiaries.'x In general, a higher degree of duty will be owed to 
57. Sec Felix v. Lucent 'J'cchnologics, Inc., Jll7 F.3d 1116 (lOth Cir. 2004) (noting the large 
number, v·ulnerability, and reliance of plan beneficiaries who were impacted hy a company merger 
decision in considering an ERISA preemption of employees' claims); ()VC Network, inc. v. 
l'aramount Co11unun. Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 126() (Del. C:h. 19<J3) (finding that the board of directors 
had breached their duty to shareholders of a large public company by not becoming fully inl(mned 
during change of control negotiations); Lewis v. Hmzqwc/1, Inc., I <Jll7 W f. 14747 at ' 2 (Del. Ch. ) uly 
2H, l<JK7) ("By reason of the director defendants' positions within the Company, they are in fiduciary 
relatiomhips with plaintiff and the other class members [shareholders] and owe to them the highest 
obligations of good titith and litir dealing. The director defendants have breached their fiduciary 
duties to the Comp;my's public shareholders .... "). 
SK Sec US. 1'. Sanden, 4lll'ed. Appx. 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) ("[T]he purpose 
of appointing a conservator is 'to preserve the estate of an incompell'nt or disabled perwn.' ... [A] 
comcrvator 'shall have the same duties and powers as a guardian of a minor, and all laws related to 
the guardianship of a minor shall be applicable to a conservator.' 'A conservator occupies a fiduciary 
position of trust of the highest and most sacred character." (quoting Folts v. jones, 132 S. W.2d 205, 
20K (Tenn. l<J3<J))); Moose v. U.S., 674 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. I':Ji\2) (reversing the lower courts ruling 
that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims by minor Indian children against the united States 
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very young and very old beneficiaries. We would expect the age 
of beneficiaries to be a significant factor in the educational 
context, where the types and magnitude of duties owed to 
children in day care or pre-school situations will vary from the 
duties owed to elementary, secondary, high school, college, and 
graduate level students. 5Y For example, one area where teachers, 
professors and other educators are often accused of fiduciary 
malfeasance involves sexual relationships with students. We 
would expect the magnitude of duty surrounding sexual relations 
with students would be much higher when dealing with minors 
than with adults, and even when dealing with adults, we would 
expect a higher degree of duty would attend younger adults in 
comparison with older adults. 
• Experience and Sophistication of Beneficiaries: (high, medium, 
low). Closely related to age is the experience and sophistication 
of beneficiaries. Courts often consider this as a separate factor, 
however, since chronological age is an imperfect proxy for 
ascertaining experience and sophistication. In general, fiduciaries 
will owe a greater degree of duty to beneficiaries who are 
relatively inexperienced or unsophisticated.60 In the educational 
government t(Jr mismanagement of a fund created to pay a judgment intended to compensate Indian 
children's tribe for the loss of their homeland. The court found that the government did hold the 
judgment in trust for the children and reversed for determination on breach); Richcl/c L. v. lioman 
Catholic Archbishop, 106 Cal. App. 4th 257, 273 (lst Disl. 2003) ("The vulnerability that is the 
necessary predicate of a confidential [or fiduciary] relation ... usually arises from advanced age, 
youth, lack of education, weakness of mind, grief, sickness, or some other incapacity." (intenul 
citation omitted)). 
5'1. See e.g. Ward v. Greene, 2001 WL 358873 at "6-7 (Conn. Super. Mar. 20, 2001) 
(recognizing the fiduciary relationship and duty of a day care provider, who liJtally c1buscd a two-
year-old, and a child placement agency, which failed repeatedly to report previous cases of abuse by 
the provider); Drueding v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 482 So. 2d 83, 86 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1'186) 
(fmding that supervisors at day care nurseries are "charged with the highest duty of care toward 
children placed in their custody" and that "supervising teachers must t(>llow a reasonable standard of 
care commensurate with the age of the children under the attendant circumstances"). 
60. See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 884, 8S8 (E. D. Mich. 1978) (contrasting 
sick, elderly plaintiffs in cases finding fiduciary relationships with a plaintiff who had "extensive 
education, experience, and presumed sophistication"); Stokes v. Henson, 265 Cal. H.ptr. 836, 195-96 
(App. 4th Dist. 1990) (holding that Henson breached his fiduciary duty to "unsophisticated" 
investors and knew as much); Bero Motors v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2001 WI. 1167533 at • 5 (Mich. App. 
Oct. 2, 20tll) (finding no fiduciary relationship where "the parties' existing and continued 
relationship was driven by profits" against "a commercial backdrop where sophisticated commercial 
entities .. regulate the minutiae of their relationship through written contracts"); Moore v. Gregory, 
131 S.E. 692, 706 (Va. 1926) (finding that a tiduciary relationship existed between an heir and the 
other parties in the transaction of his uncle's will, because the other parties "occupied a position of 
superiority and influence over the [heir], on account of the confidence he naturally reposed in them 
by reason of ties of relationship, age, and superior intelligence and experience" and because the heir 
"had barely reached his majority, was merely a colkge student, and had no business or legal training 
or experience"). 
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context, as with age, we would expect courts to be quite sensitive 
to the experience and sophistication of students, both in an 
absolute sense, and also in comparison to their teachers and 
other fiduciaries.r' 1 For example, in cases involving alleged sexual 
misconduct of teachers, the experience and sophistication of 
students is likely to be considered by courts, although not always 
explicitly or directly. 
• Vulnerability of Beneficiaries: (high, medium, low). Another 
related factor is the vulnerability of beneficiaries. A high degree 
of beneficiary vulnerability will correlate with a high degree of 
duty, whereas beneficiaries who are not particularly vulnerable 
will correlate with a lower degree of duty being owed to them.62 
In cases involving alleged breaches of duty by educators, we 
would expect vulnerability to be a relevant consideration, 
especially in the pre-collegiate context, where the age and 
experience of students, as well as mental, physical and emotional 
handicaps, might be relevant to an assessment of the degree of 
duty.61 
2. Characteristics of the Relationship 
177 
In addition to the characteristics of the parties, the characteristics of 
the relationship between a fiduciary and beneficiary are also important in 
determining the magnitude of duty of fiduciaries. Courts consider a 
number of features of the fiduciary relationship, including factors 
relating to its formation, the history and duration of the relationship 
before an alleged breach occurs, the nature of the beneficiary's reliance 
upon the fiduciary, and divergences in the interests of the fiduciary and 
beneficiary. It is not always possible, nor is it particularly important, to 
61. Sec e.g. Chou v. U. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1362-63 (fed. Cir. 2001) (finding a fiduciary 
duty owed by department chairman to graduate student, based on the "disparity of their experiences 
and roles, and [the department chairman's] responsibility to make patenting decisions regarding [the 
student's] inventions"). 
62. Sec e.g. Intcrc/aim Holdings Ud. v. Ness, Motely, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, 298 1'. 
Supp. 2d 746 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (allowing for punitive damages against a law firm that breached its 
fiduciary, noting that vulnerability is a factor in whether to allow punitive damages in this type of 
case to remain); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, )., 
dissenting) ("The singular vulnerability of the minority in a close corporation has prompted courts 
of equity to impose fiduciary obligations on the majority shareholders in their dealings with the 
minority and to require 'a high degree of fidelity and good faith."' (quoting Fender v. Prescott, 476 
l\:.Y.S.2d 12H, 131-132 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1984))). 
63. Sec e.g. Schneider v. Plymouth St. College, 744 A.2d 101, 105 (N.H. 1999) ("'n the context 
of sexual harassment by faculty members, the relationship between a post-secondary institution and 
its students is a fiduciary one. Students are in a vulnerable situation because [ ofl 'the power 
differential between faculty and students."' (citations ommitted) (quoting Karen Bogart & Nan Stein, 
Breaking the Silence; Sexual Harassment in Hducation, 64 Peabody). Educ. 146, 157 ( 1987))). 
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clearly demark factors that might affect a court's assessment of a 
relationship as opposed to factors relevant to an assessment of the 
characteristics of the parties to that relationship. Nevertheless, courts 
often consider the relationship and its characteristics as a separate topic 
of enquiry, and it is useful to focus upon the relationship between the 
parties as well as the respective characteristics of each party. 
(a) Formation of the Fiduciary Relationship 
• Timing and Length of Relationship: (long-standing or recent; 
continuous, intermittent, one time). In general, a higher degree 
of duty will attend long standing, continuous fiduciary 
relationships in comparison to recent or one-time relationships, 
although heightened duties may occur at the outset and at 
important intermittent times during a relationship.64 In the 
educational context, we would expect that teacher-student 
relationships that extend over many years, such as a research 
relationship between a professor and graduate student, or 
between a thesis advisor and a PhD candidate, might have an 
attendant heightened magnitude of duty. On the other hand, we 
would expect a much lower magnitude of duty to exist in a 
situation involving a professor of a large introductory course 
who is accused of a breach of duty by a student who received a 
disappointing grade. 
• Degree of Formality in Creation: (formal, informal). In general, 
a higher degree of duty will exist in fiduciary relationships, such 
as trusts, where there is a high degree of formality in the creation 
of the relationship.6" In contrast, relationships created merely 
through reliance will have a lower degree of duty. Cases 
involving breach of fiduciary duty often distinguish between 
formal and informal fiduciary relationships, and the magnitude 
04. See In rc Sallee, 2811 F.3d R?k (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that debtors with no longstanding 
relationship with a bank, and merely a generalized trust in the bank, did not have a fiduciary 
relatiomhip with the bank); Lakewood Developments Corp.\'. Schultheis, 2004 WL 76472') at '7 (N.D. 
Tex. Apr. 6, 2004) (finding that no flduciary duty existed between the parties because "there is no 
allegation of the type of long-standing interaction based on mutual trmt necessary to suggest that 
any confidential relationship existed"). 
65. See Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros Thanksgiving, 64 !'.3d 227,231 (5th Cir. ILJ'1:i) 
("[A[ fiduciary relationship can be created outside of a f(,nnal agreement.. This relationship, 
however, 'is an extraordinary one' and will only be established in exceptional cases." (quoting 
Stcphanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. App. 1st Dist. 1993))); Adomo v. Delgado, 2004 \VI. 
234Hl58 at '2 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. Oct. 20, 2004) ("A fiduciary relationship may be created either 
formally, by contract, or inlclrmally. An infimnal relationship, however, cannot be unilateral, and 
occurs only where "both parties understand that a special relationship or trust has been reposed." 
(quoting Cull>crtson v. Wigley Title Age my, Inc., 2002 WI. 219570 at' 3 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. Feb. 13, 
2002) (internal quotation omitted))). 
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of duty owed in informal fiduciary relationships tends to be 
lower. To the extent that a fiduciary relationship is found to exist 
between educators and students, we would expect courts to 
evaluate those situations under rubrics applicable to informal 
fiduciary relationships, in which case courts would be expected 
to focus upon factors such as whether there was an especially 
high degree of reliance and trust, an unusual amount of power, 
or particular vulnerability on the part of the beneficiary. 
• Names, Titles, and Level of Expectations: (lofty, serious, 
mundane). A higher degree of duty will exist if names, titles, and 
expectations indicate a high degree of seriousness and 
responsibility.60 Although in general we would not expect this 
factor to be of tremendous significance in cases involving 
teachers, it is more likely that titles might be emphasized in cases 
involving school administrators or university professors. 
• Nature and Degree of Promises Involved: (solemn, serious, 
casual). If a fiduciary agrees to be bound by specific promises and 
covenants, it is likely that a higher degree of duty will exist, 
especially if those duties are described in ways that indicate a 
high degree of duty. We would also expect this factor to be of 
relatively little significance in the educational context, although 
courts might look to university publications such as course 
catalogues or promotional literature for evidence of specific 
promises or expectations that might be created. 
• Specificity of Powers and Duties of Fiduciary: (core, peripheral; 
specific, unspecific). Another characteristic of the fiduciary 
relationship that will affect the magnitude of a fiduciary's duty is 
the specificity and clarity of the fiduciary's power's and duties. 
To the extent that the powers and duties of a fiduciary are 
described or understood in detail, or the closer that a matter lies 
to the core of a fiduciary's area of responsibility, it will be more 
likely that a high degree of duty will be required in connection 
with those rights and duties within their enumerated scope. If the 
expectations of a fiduciary are clearly defined, it is more likely 
that a fiduciary will be held to a strict standard of performance 
with respect to those expectations. As a corollary, if a fiduciary's 
179 
66. See Shell v. King, 2004 WL 1749186 (Tenn. App. Aug. 5, 2004) (emphasizing the 
defendant's position as Chief Manager of an LLC in determining that he violated his fiduciary 
obligations); In rc Ahrams, 229 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he managing partner 
of a partnership owes to his copartners the highest fiduciary obligations known at law .... "); Moses 
v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950, 964-65 (Pa. Super. 1988) (Cirillo, Pres.)., concurring and dissenting) 
(finding that when "the fiduciary relationship between a patient and physician-a relationship built 
on the highest expectation of trust--is betrayed," such a breach is "condemned"). 
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rights and duties are specified in detail, it is less likely that a high 
degree of duty will attend events near the periphery or beyond 
the scope of the fiduciary's specific powers and responsibilities. 67 
On the other hand, if the rights and duties of a fiduciary are 
vague or subject to minimal elucidation, as a general matter it is 
likely that a lower magnitude of duty will exist, but it is also 
possible that such a fiduciary may be held to have violated a duty 
that he did not even fully appreciate or understand, since the 
distinction between core and peripheral responsibilities and the 
boundary between what is and is not required of such a fiduciary 
is not clearly defined. With respect to teachers and educators, if a 
particular duty lies clearly near the core of the teacher's sphere of 
responsibility, or if a duty is specific and well-defined, we would 
expect the degree of duty to be higher than for duties that lie on 
the periphery of the teacher's responsibility or that are ill-
defined. 
• Attempts to Contractually Alter Fiduciary Duties: (contractual 
magnification, silence, contractual diminution; joint, unilateral). 
Fiduciaries and beneficiaries sometimes enter into contractual 
agreements that seek to alter the baseline duties that a fiduciary 
of a certain type normally owes. For example, under the 
corporate laws of many states, shareholders are able to pass an 
amendment to the corporation's charter or articles of 
incorporation that limit director liability for breaches of certain 
categories of fiduciary duty. 6H Similarly, many state statutes 
governing limited liability companies allow members to define 
down the degree of care and loyalty that managers owe members 
and that members owe each other. Thus, the magnitude of duty 
will often be lower in situations where parties have explicitly 
agreed contractually to limit fiduciary duties. On the other hand, 
parties might also increase baseline duties by contractual 
agreement, or define those baseline duties in such a way that 
magnifies them. It is less likely that attempts to limit fiduciary 
duty will be successful if the duties in question are not reciprocal, 
or if the party seeking to limit his duties has unequal bargaining 
leverage or sophistication."9 It would seem unlikely that teachers 
67. Sec Richard A. Berjian, D.O., Inc. v. Ohio Bell Tel., Co., 375 N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ohio 197R) 
(holding that an exculpatory clause in a telephone company contract, which limited the company's 
liability ftlr negligent failure to correctly display advertising in the classified section oi its directory, 
was not void because absent any willful or wanton misconduct, the telephone company was entitled 
to contractually limit its liability for such a service). 
6R. See e.g. Delaware Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
6'1. See Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 19RY); Appletrec Square I v. 
lnvestmark, Inc. 494 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. 1993); Crosby v. Beam, 54X N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 19R9); Hayes 
v. Northern Hills Gen. Hasp., 628 N.W.2d 739, 747 (S.D. 2001) ("Courts have generally held that 
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or educational institutions would enjoy a high degree of success 
if they were to attempt to limit or disclaim their fiduciary duties 
since there are such significant asymmetries in power between 
universities and would-be students in setting the terms and 
conditions of their relationship. But in certain circumstances 
courts could be expected to look to university handbooks and 
procedures, for example, for guidance about the nature and 
magnitude of duties. 
• Character of Negotiations and Bargaining Power: (active 
negotiation, moderate, medium, minimal, non-existent; equal 
bargaining power, unequal bargaining power). In certain 
circumstances, courts are suspicious of contractual efforts to 
modify fiduciary duties, especially efforts to diminish duties in 
situations where there is no real negotiation between the parties, 
or if one party appears to be engaged in self-dealing. Thus, for 
example, a fiduciary who attempts to limit responsibility through 
adhesion contracts may not be successfuJ.711 On the other hand, if 
an effort to modify or limit the scope of fiduciary duties is the 
result of genuine negotiation between parties of roughly 
equivalent bargaining power and sophistication, then it is more 
likely that such efforts will be respected. 71 We would expect that 
efforts by educators and educational institutions, particularly in 
the public sector, to limit or modify their duties will be of limited 
success, since there is no real opportunity for bargaining and 
negotiations. In contrast, in the private school setting, and in the 
context of higher education, efforts to define and limit fiduciary 
duties through contract might enjoy a higher degree of success. 
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where there is a contractual agreement limiting the scope of the fiduciary duty, and where self 
dealing is evident, such agreements are invalid." (citing Wartzski v. Redji>rd, 926 i'.2d 11 (I st Cir. 
1991))); 
70. See Lafrenz v. Lake County Fair Rd., 360 N.E.2d 605, 609 (1nd. App. 1977) (finding that 
part of the criteria for determining whether contractual exculpation provisions are invalid as 
affecting public interest includes whether, "[i[n exercising a superior bargaining power the party 
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, <lnd makes no provision 
whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence." 
(citations omitted)). 
71. Sec McTighe v. New Fngland Telephone and Telegraph Co., 216 F.2d 26,28 (2d Cir. 1954) 
(holding that contractual limitations of a telephone company's liability for correct advertising was 
valid. finding that "[i[f there be some disparity in the bargaining power of the contracting parties it is 
no more than may be tiJund generally to exist"); LaFrenz, 360 N.E.2d at 608 (Ind. App. 1977) 
("[WI here one party is at such an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the e!Tect of the 
contract is to put him at the mercy of the other's negligence. the contract is void as against public 
policy."). 
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(b) History and Duration of Relationship before the Alleged Breach 
• History: (established, periodic, episodic, occasional, one time). 
In general, the magnitude of duty will be greater in established 
relationships, than in relationships that are episodic, or based 
upon a single event or encounter. 72 In the educational context, 
we would expect that fiduciaries in long-term, established 
relationships will be held to a higher degree of duty than will be 
individuals whose encounters with each other are less frequent or 
a matter of happenstance. 
• Voluntariness of the Association: (mutual choice, unilateral 
choice, no choice). In general, duties will be greater, or at least 
more clearly defined, in associations in which the fiduciary and 
the beneficiary have mutually and voluntarily selected each other 
and agreed upon the terms and scope of the relationship. 73 If 
choice is unilateral, then a fiduciary might generally be held to a 
somewhat higher degree of duty if he has sought out and selected 
his beneficiary, whereas the degree of duty might be somewhat 
lower if it was the beneficiary who made the unilateral selection. 
In contrast, if fiduciaries and beneficiaries find themselves in an 
accidental relationship, or if the relationship is thrust upon them, 
then the magnitude of duty may be somewhat lower. In the 
educational context, if a teacher and student affirmatively and 
mutually select each other, as in a research or thesis advisory 
relationship, then we would expect the magnitude of duty to be 
relatively higher than if the relationship is based upon unilateral 
selection, or if it is the result of an assignment that does not 
reflect the will or preference of either party. 
Exclusivity of the Relationship: (exclusive, primary, 
nonexclusive). In general, a higher degree of duty will attend 
relationships that are exclusive in nature. 74 Similarly, if a 
particular fiduciary relationship represents the fiduciary's 
primary occupation, a relatively high degree of duty is likely to 
attend that relationship. On the other hand, if a fiduciary 
72. Fleming v. Tex. Coastal Bank of Pasadena, 67 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Tex. App. 14th Dist. 2002) 
(holding that a bank and bank president had no fiduciary duty to disclose another customer's 
account information to a new customer, because the new customer had no long-term relationship 
with the bank or bank president which may have created an atmosphere of trust). 
73. See VNA Plus, Inc. v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1264 (D. Kan. 
1998) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty in part because the defendant "knowingly and voluntarily 
undertook fiduciary duties" to the plaintiff). 
74. See Boilermakers Local No. 374 v. Nat. Lab. Rei. Bd., 852 F.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. C:ir. !988) 
(holding that a union's exclusive hiring hall arrangement is held to a high standard of fair dealing 
and fiduciary duty because of its potential for coerciveness and exclusiveness). 
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represents multiple beneficiaries, we would expect that this 
would sometimes result in a somewhat lower magnitude of duty. 
For example, a manager for an artist or athlete who works 
exclusively for that individual is likely to be held to a relatively 
higher magnitude of duty than an agent who represents multiple 
artists or athletes. Further down the continuum, a real estate 
agent representing numerous home buyers and sellers, or a travel 
agent who acts on behalf of numerous clients whom the agent 
may not even know, will be held to relatively lower degrees of 
duty. We would expect that teachers who have exclusive, or even 
primary, responsibility for a student will be held to a higher 
magnitude of duty with respect to that student than would a 
teacher who does not have such a degree of responsibility. 
Similarly, if a teacher has responsibility for a relatively small 
number of students, we would expect the degree of duty to be 
quite high. On the other hand, if a teacher interacts with 
hundreds or thousands of students at a time, the magnitude of 
duty towards each student may be quite low, although the duty 
to the students as a group may be higher. 
• Reciprocity: (reciprocal, unilateral). Another factor that may 
affect the magnitude of duty in a fiduciary relationship is 
whether the duties owed are unilateral or reciprocal, and whether 
each party owes the same types of duty to the other. The 
implications of this consideration, however, do not always run in 
the same direction. In some circumstances, courts find a higher 
degree of duty to exist based upon the fact that duties are 
reciprocal. In a partnership, for example, where duties among 
partners are mutual, a relatively high degree of duty exists, and 
courts sometimes cite the reciprocity of duties as a factor in their 
analysis. 7 ~ On the other hand, when a fiduciary has a great 
advantage over a beneficiary in power, experience, control, and 
expertise, duties that are unilateral may be magnified not only 
based upon these factors, but also based upon the fact of the duty 
being unilateral. For example, unilateral duties to those who are 
particularly vulnerable will often be very high. Thus, in different 
types of situations the fact that duties are reciprocal as well as the 
f~lct that duties are unilateral may be cited as factors that magnify 
a fiduciary's duty. In the educational context, we would also 
expect that whether duties are reciprocal or unilateral may enter 
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75. Sec Hooper v. Yoder, 737 P.2d S52, 859 (Colo. 1987) ("Partners in a business enterprise 
owe to one another the highest duty of loyalty; they stand in a relationship of trust and confidence to 
each other and are bound by standards of good conduct and square dealing."); Couri v. Couri, 447 
".E.2d 334,337 (ill. 19H3); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1929) ("Joint adventurers, 
like copMtners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the tines! loyalty."). 
11:\4 n.I.U . .t<,lJUl.-1\llVl~ 1\l~lJ LJ\VV JVUKl"\11\L lLUU:J 
into a court's analysis of the magnitude of duty. For example, in a 
situation involving duties among professors or colleagues, the 
mutuality of duties might be cited as a factor. On the other hand, 
in a situation involving the relationship between a teacher and 
student, the unilateral character of the duties may be cited 
among other factors such as age and vulnerability of the student 
beneficiaries as a basis for magnifying the duty owed. 
• Relative Power, Sophistication, Information, Control: (fiduciary 
superior, equal, beneficiary superior). The degree of duty will 
also vary based upon the relative power, sophistication, 
information, and control of the parties.76 It is not surprising that 
a fiduciary with a relative advantage will be held to a higher 
degree of duty. But it is also sometimes the case that when the 
beneficiary of a fiduciary's duty is comparatively powerful, 
sophisticated, and informed, the degree of duty in his favor will 
be lower. 77 We would expect such considerations to often be 
quite important in the educational context. Because professional 
educators will often be viewed as having relative advantages over 
students in these respects, this may provide a basis for 
heightened fiduciary duties. In cases involving children in 
elementary or secondary school, differentials in power, 
sophistication, information and control will be particularly acute. 
But we would also expect this to be considered as a factor in cases 
involving university professors and administrators as well. 
(c) Reliance 
The scope and nature of a beneficiary's reliance upon a fiduciary is 
76. Sec e.g. Zurich Capital Markets Inc. v. Coglianese, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1121 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) ("'[T]hc touchstone of a fiduciary relationship is the presence of a significant degree of 
dominance and superiority of one party over another."' (quoting Lagen v. Bah·or Co, 653 N.E.2d 96R 
(Ill App. 2d Dist. 1995))); In re Estate of Rothenberg, 530 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1988) 
("The bctors which may be considered in determining whether a fiduciary relation exists are the 
degree of kinship, disparity in age, health, mental condition, education and business experience 
between the parties and the extent to which the allegedly servient party entrusted the handling of his 
business and financial affairs to the dominant party and reposed faith and confidence in him. Two 
things must appear: that one party was, in fact, 'servient' and the other party 'dominant."') 
77. Sec e.g. Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (S.D. Cal. 
1993) (precluding liability for breach of fiduciary duty because, "[b ]y selecting the corporate form as 
a manner of achieving their goals, Miles and Scripps, both sophisticated parties, elected the benefits 
granted under that form and rejected the ... benefits of continuing with a joint venture." (emphasis 
added)); A han v. Gram mas, 2004 WL 2724111 at '13 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 2004) (finding no 
"evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude, or even infer, that there was a breach of any 
tlduciary duty" to plaintiff because, although not an attorney, plaintiff was "a sophisticated 
businessman" and "[t]he level of notice for consent theref(ne is not required to be as explicit as it 
would be for someone with lesser or no experience"). 
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another aspect of their relationship that will affect the magnitude of duty 
owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary. Several different aspects or 
dimensions of reliance may be significant. 
• Degree of Reliance by Beneficiary: (high, medium, low). Most 
obviously, the extent to which a beneficiary relies upon a 
fiduciary to serve and protect her interests will affect the 
magnitude of duty owed by the fiduciary. In general, the greater 
the degree of the beneficiary's reliance upon the fiduciary, the 
greater the degree of duty to which the fiduciary will be held. 7x 
On the other hand, if the beneficiary is not particularly 
dependent upon the fiduciary, the magnitude of duty may be 
somewhat lower. We would expect this consideration to apply in 
the expected manner in cases involving educators, and that it will 
often be quite a significant factor. Students often have quite a 
high degree of reliance upon teachers, educators, and educational 
institutions, and we would expect the degree of duty to be 
proportionally high. However, we would not expect that the 
mere fact that a student, especially an older student, places trust 
in a teacher or educational institution will necessarily result in a 
high magnitude of duty?9 
Cause of Reliance: (induced by fiduciary, mutually agreed 
upon, implied by fiduciary, inferred by beneficiary, projected by 
beneficiary). The cause of the beneficiary's reliance may also 
affect the degree of duty owed by the fiduciary.Ho In general, duty 
will be higher if the fiduciary is responsible for the fact that a 
beneficiary feels a high degree of reliance. For example, if the 
fiduciary issues promises or assurances to the beneficiary that the 
fiduciary is looking out for and protecting the beneficiary's 
interests, then a relatively high magnitude of duty is likely to 
exist. This factor is most likely to be of significance in situations 
78. See U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) ("'[A]t the heart of the fiduciary 
relationship' lies 'reliance, and de facto control and dominance.' The relation 'exists when confidence 
is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on the other."' (citations 
omitted)). 
79. See Zumbrun v. U. ofS. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 506 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1972) C'The mere 
placing of trust in another person does not create a fiduciary relationship. An agreement to 
communicate one's knowledge, exercising his special knowledge and skill in the are of learning 
concerned, does not create a trust but only a contractual obligation."); Ho v. U. o( Tex. at Arlington, 
984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex. App. 7th Dist. 1998) (finding no fiduciary relationship between a doctoral 
student and the university faculty advising and teaching that student); Abrams v. Mary Washington 
College., 1994 WL 1031166 at '4 (Va. Cir. Apr. 27, 1994) (holding that there is no common law 
"special trust relationship" between college officials and all students). 
80. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 1'.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) ("'fa person solicits another to 
trust him in matters in which he represents himself to be expert as well as trustworthy and the other 
is not expert and accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in him, a fiduciary relation is 
established."). 
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where the affirmative assurances by a fiduciary are coupled with 
underhanded or secretive activities by that tlduciary that serve 
the interests of the tlduciary at the expense of the beneficiary, or 
that create a conflict of interest between the parties. On the other 
hand, if the reasons for reliance are merely implied by the 
tlduciary, or if the reasons for reliance arc inferred by the 
beneficiary, then the degree of duty will move progressively 
towards the lower end of the spectrum. If reliance is based largely 
or entirely upon the projection of duty by a beneficiary upon a 
would-be tlduciary, this will likely result in an even lower 
magnitude of duty. We would expect this factor to apply in the 
educational context in the anticipated manner. If teachers or 
other professional educators have said or done specific things to 
encourage reliance, for example by giving assurances and 
asserting trustworthiness, this might have the effect of increasing 
the degree of duty, especially if the fiduciary is acting in a self-
serving manner.Ht On the other hand, if an older and relatively 
experienced student simply feels that his professors should have 
a responsibility to protect and defend his interests as he perceives 
them, this would be unlikely to result in a high magnitude of 
duty.x2 
Awareness of Beneficiaries' Reliance: (high, medium, low, 
nonexistant). A fiduciary in general will be held to a higher 
degree of duty if she is aware that the beneficiary is relying upon 
her, especially if she understands that the beneficiary's degree of 
reliance is high.81 Increased knowledge always increases one's 
ill. See Chou v. U. of Chi., 254 !'.3d 1317, 1363 (i'ed. Cir. 2001) (holding that a graduate 
student suftkiently stated a breach of fiduciary duty claim against her department d1erirman who 
"specifically represented to her that he would protect and give her proper credit l(>r her research and 
inventions," and then who then named himself as the inventor of her discoveries). 
82. See 1-io v. U. of Tex. at Arlillgton, 9S4 S.W.2d (172 (Tex. App. 7th Dist. 19'!~) (finding,'" a 
matter of law, that "formal tlduciary relationships do not exist between teachers .rnd student> in a 
normal education setting," and that no infi>rmal fiduciary relationship existed which would impose 
upon the university a duty to disclose inti>rmation to stop the doctor,rJ student from se,·king a 
doctoral degree when the student was later dismissed from the doctoral program l(>r acackmic 
reasons); Mews v. Corp. of' Gonzaga U., 618 P.2d 106, IOX-09 (Wash. App. Di\' .. 1 IYSO) (tinding that 
a law school did not have a fiduciary duty to inform the student of the possibility of bilurc became it 
is unreasonable to require the university to warn applicants of the obvious). 
83. Sec Indus. Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia l'aciji'c, 44 l'..ld 40, ·14 (1st Cir. 1995) c·In determining 
whether such a transt(>rmation [from a business relationship into a fiduciary relationship] has t.1ken 
place, courts look to the defendant's knowledge of the plaintilrs reliance and considcT the rclarion of 
the parties, the plaintiffs business capacity contrasted with that of the dc!Cndant, an,J tire 'rvadines< 
of the plaintitl to follow the defendant's guidance in complicated tramactions wherein the defendant 
has specialized knowledge."' (quoting Broomfield v. Kosow, 212 N.F.2d 556, 560 (\1a-". 1'!65))); 
Bonson v. Diocese of Altoona· Johnstown, 67 Pa. D. & C: 4th ·119, 4.1.1 (Pa. Com. Pleas Ct. .\1ar II, 
2004) (upholding a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against a Catholic Bishop who s,·xu,>lh 
molested an altar boy and the parish in part because the clergymen "repeatedly imtilled 111 eac·h of its 
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level of accountability in law, ethics, or the common sense of 
fairness. Thus, if professional educators are aware, or should be 
aware, that a student has an unusually high degree of reliance, we 
would expect that this might have the effect of elevating the 
degree of duty. 
(d) Divergence of Interests of Fiduciary and Beneficiaries 
• Degree of Alignment of Interests: (conflict of interest; low 
alignment; medium, high, identical interests). If the fiduciary's 
interests depart significantly from the interests of the beneficiary, 
the fiduciary will likely be held to a higher degree of duty, given 
the heightened risk that the fiduciary might serve his own rather 
than the beneficiary's interest.H4 Special rules imposing 
heightened duties exist in numerous contexts regarding conflicts 
of interest, corporate opportunities, and self-dealing, which are 
aimed to address problems that arise when interests of a 
fiduciary and beneficiary diverge. On the other hand, if the 
interests of the fiduciary and the beneficiary are closely aligned, it 
is more likely that a court will not feel a need to impose a high 
degree of duty, since a court may feel confident in presuming 
that the fiduciary will be motivated by self interest to exhibit the 
requisite degree of care and loyalty.H5 As an example, there is not 
a developed body of law about the fiduciary duties of airplane 
pilots towards their passengers, even though indicia such as 
reliance and relative expertise might lead one to believe that this 
ought to be a paradigmatic fiduciary relationship. But because 
the pilot's and passengers' interests are so closely aligned, we do 
not typically think of this relationship under the fiduciary rubric. 
In the educational context, we would expect teachers and 
187 
parishioners, including the plaintiff~ the belief that priests are figures of authority who should be 
relied upon to protect the well being of children in the parishes"). 
84. See In reMarriage of Egedi, 88 Cal. App. 4th 17, 23 (2d Dist. 2001) ("[C]ounsel 'who 
undertake to represent parties with divergent interests owe the highest duty to each to make a full 
disclosure of all facts and circumstances which are necessary to enable the parties to make a fully 
informed decision regarding the subject matter of the litigation. including the areas of potential 
conflict and the possibility and desirability of seeking independent legal advice."' (quoting Klemm v. 
Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (App. 5th Dist. 1977))); Bd. of Managers v. Fairway at N. Hills, 193 
A.D.2d 322, 325 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1993) ("[A] condominium's tlrst board of managers is 
subject to 'a great potential for conflicts of interest,' such that 'a very high standard of duty' must be 
imposed upon it to ensure that its members do not gear their decisions to benefit the sponsor at the 
expense of the association or its members." (citation omitted)). 
85. Sec Oft: Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Investcorp S.A., 137 F Supp. 2d 
502, 507-512 (S.D.N .Y. 200 I) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty to non-management directors by 
management directors or holders of preferred stock because "[a]ll the evidence demonstrates that the 
interests oi the shareholder defendants were aligned with, and not in contlict wilh, the interests of all 
the other shareholders"). 
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administrators to be held to a heightened duty in situations 
where there is a conflict, or potential cont1ict, between their 
interests and the interests of students. For example, these duties 
would be particularly elevated when a teacher or professor stands 
to benefit by taking credit for work properly attributable to a 
student. On the other hand, in situations where a fiduciary does 
not stand to gain from an outcome that is disappointing to a 
student, such as a student who has received a failing grade, it is 
much less likely that a court will find a heightened duty. 
3. Characteristics of the Subject Matter 
In addition to the characteristics of the parties, and the 
characteristics of their relationship, the characteristics of the subject 
matter in question is also relevant to an assessment of the degree of duty 
to which courts will hold a fiduciary. Four related characteristics of the 
subject matter are often taken into account by courts: the significance of 
the event in question; the value and magnitude of the entrustment; the 
uniqueness of the entrustment; and the public visibility and importance 
of the case. In general, the greater the significance of the subject matter at 
stake, the more likely it is that a fiduciary will be held to have a high 
degree of duty. 
(a) Significance of the Event in Question 
• Degree of Significance and Importance: (high, medium, low; 
absolute terms, relative terms). If the subject matter of a fiduciary 
relationship has a high degree of significance, a high degree of 
duty will be expected.x6 On the other hand if the subject matter is 
only of little or incidental significance, the magnitude of duty 
will likely be lower. For example, a lawyer whose client faces 
potential capital punishment should be held to a higher standard 
of competence and performance than a lawyer who defends 
someone accused of committing a misdemeanor. x; A fiduciary 
86. For example, in Meinhard v. Salmon, 104 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). the significance of the 
subject matter had been greatly enhanced by the construction of c;rand Central Station in the 
neighborhood. This is not mentioned in the case, although the location is given. hut commentators 
often point out that the high degree of duty in that case may have been in part due to the richness of 
the corporate opportunity at issue. 
87. Sec Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 f.3d 915,919 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacating defendant's death 
sentence afier finding en bane that defendant's counsel at the penalty phase was deficient and that 
defendant suffered prejudice and as a result); Anderson v. Calderon, 276 F.3d 483, 484-85 (9th Cir. 
2001) (Reinhart,)., dissenting)("! cannot join my colleagues in their decision to permit the state to 
proceed with the execution of an individual whose death sentence may well have been imposed, not 
because of the crime he committed, but because of the incompetence of an attorney with little 
integrity and a pattern of ine!Tective performance in capital cases... If the courts appoint 
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might be held to a relatively high magnitude of duty even with 
respect to a matter that might appear to be of modest 
significance if it is of real significance to the particular 
beneficiary. For example, oxygen might appear to be relatively 
insignificant, unless someone is being denied access to it. Thus, 
the quantum of duty that attended the loss of a specific dollar 
amount of money might lie upon a sliding scale depending upon 
whether the beneficiary was very wealthy at one end of the 
spectrum as opposed to destitute at the other end of the 
spectrum. 
(b) Corpus: Value and Magnitude of Entrustment 
189 
Sometimes a fiduciary is obliged to take care of a particular 
entrustment and to manage or invest that entrustment in the interests of 
specified beneficiaries. For example, a trustee will have responsibility to 
invest the funds in a trust according to standards of prudence, 
diversification, etc. The magnitude of duty that will be imposed upon 
such a fiduciary will often vary based upon the value and magnitude of 
the entrustment. There are several factors that contribute to an 
assessment of the value of a corpus of entrustment. 
Tangible Amount Involved: (large, medium, small, 
nonexistent). Most obviously, the tangible amount of an 
entrustment will affect the magnitude of duty that will attend the 
entrustment. If the financial value of the entrustment is large, it 
is more likely that a high degree of duty will exist, whereas if the 
financial value of the entrustment is small, the corresponding 
duty is likely to be of a lower magnitude. For example, trustees of 
large pension or retirement funds are subject to higher 
magnitude duties compared with the expectations of a family 
member who is assigned to invest funds in a small family trust. 
Intangible Values Involved: (large, medium, small, 
nonexistent). In addition to tangible value, a variety of factors 
may influence the intangible value of an entrustment. High 
magnitude intangible values may result in a heightened degree of 
duty. HH 
incompetent counsel to handle a capital case, we should not then compound that judicial error by 
permitting the state to execute the ill-represented defendant."); johnson v. State, 1992 WL 158313 at 
"1 (Tenn. <:rim. App. july 9, 1992) (holding that defendant did not have incompetent counsel in his 
representation for three misdemeanor charges). 
88. See In re Mullen, 200 B.R. 352, 357 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) ("When a party uses a 
business's goodwill to its own advantage, the party has breached a fiduciary duty owed to the 
business, and the party in interest and the business may recover [the value of this intangible asset]." 
(citing Baker v. Pratt, 176 Cal. App. 3d 370, 380-81 (2d Dis!. 1986))). 
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For the most part fiduciaries in the educational context are not 
responsible for investing or managing funds. An exception is the 
management of universities' endowment and retirement funds, and we 
would expect the fiduciary standards that would apply in the educational 
setting would not vary significantly from the standards that apply to such 
situations in general. 
(c) Uniqueness of Entrustment 
• Type of Property Involved: (irreplaceable, unique, commodity, 
fungible). If the corpus of a fiduciary entrustment is unique or 
irreplaceable, a high degree of duty will attend that entrustment. 
Irreplaceable items such as antiquities, fine art and old 
documents of historic importance will carry high magnitude 
duties. In contrast, if the entrustment is in no way unique or 
irreplaceable, it is likely that a relatively lower degree of duty will 
exist.89 In the educational setting, we would expect that the 
highest duties will attach to human beings, since bricks and 
mortar can be replaced. 
(d) Public Importance 
A final set of factors relating to the subject matter of an entrustment 
that affects the magnitude of duty is the public importance, profile, or 
impact of a case. As the visibility and perceived public importance of a 
case increases, it is more likely that a high degree of duty will be imposed. 
Public Profile and Visibility: (high, medium, low). One 
dimension of public importance is the profile or public visibility 
of the case. If public visibility is high, we would expect this to 
increase the likelihood that a high degree of duty will be found. If 
on the other hand, public visibility is low a court may 
subconsciously, if not consciously, apply a lower degree of duty. 
We would expect this factor to sometimes be significant in the 
educational context, especially if a case involves sexual 
misconduct of a teacher involving a minor, or other misconduct 
of a shocking or self-serving nature. Because education is an 
issue that is of tremendous public importance and often in the 
public eye, public profile and visibility of a particular case may 
89. See Comcast Sound Comrmm., Inc. v. Hoeltke, 174 A.D.2d 1023, 10024 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th 
Dept. 1991) (holding that former salesmen did not breach fiduciary duty of loyalty for violation of 
noncom petition clauses because there was "no demonstration that defendants performed services of 
a unique nature for plaintiff' and "[a]lthough defendants were valuable sales personnel, they were 
not irreplaccabk nor did their leaving plaintiffs employ cause plaintiff special harm"). 
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have the effect of magnifying the degree of duty that a court finds 
in a case. 
• Public Concern or Attention: (high, medium, low). Another 
dimension of public importance is the degree of public concern 
about an issue. Even if a case does not have a high degree of 
visibility, there may be a high degree of public concern or 
attention. We would expect this t~1ctor to also sometimes result 
in the magnification of duties in the educational context. For 
example, in the area of public education, often the attention of a 
vocal group of concerned parents can raise the stakes with 
respect to the magnitude of duty that will be applied to a case. 
Public Image and Reputation of Parties: (strongly positive, 
positive, neutral, negative, strongly negative; absolute, relative). 
A related, but distinct, element of public importance involves the 
public image and reputation of the parties, both the fiduciary and 
the beneficiary. If a fiduciary has a shady or questionable 
reputation, it may be that he is held to a higher degree of duty, 
based upon skepticism about his character or motives. On the 
other hand, a person with a good reputation for character and 
integrity may be more likely given the benefit of the doubt with 
respect to an alleged breach of duty, with the effect of holding 
that person to a lower degree of duty. This factor, however, docs 
not always apply in such a simple or straightforward manner. At 
times the high public reputation of a fiduciary may be cited as a 
factor in holding that fiduciary to a particularly high standard of 
behavior. The public reputation of the beneficiary can also affect 
the magnitude of duty attributed to the fiduciary, with a good 
reputation enhancing duty and a bad reputation diminishing 
duty. 
We would expect that in the educational setting, because of 
their generally positive reputations, teachers and educators may 
often be given the benefit of the doubt with respect to issues and 
decisions that lie squarely within their areas of expertise and 
competence, such as grading students and setting standards for 
receiving or tailing to receive a degree. This might result in the 
perception and perhaps the reality of a relatively low magnitude 
of duty in these areas. On the other hand, when alleged 
misbehavior lies further from the core elements of the 
educational mission, we would expect it to be less likely that 
teachers would be afforded such leeway. Indeed, the fact that 
teachers have a reputation for trustworthiness might be 
considered a factor that enhances duty. For example, in cases 
involving alleged sexual misconduct or self-dealing, we would 
expect the high public reputation of educators to be a factor in 
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enhancing the degree of duty they owe students and other 
beneficiaries. The reputation of the beneficiary might also be a 
factor in the educational context. If a beneficiary appears to be an 
innocent victim, this may result in an enhanced degree of duty, 
whereas if the beneficiary himself appears to be engaged in self-
dealing or self-deceptive behavior, this may result in a lowered 
standard of duty being applied to the fiduciary. 
4. Source of Legal Action 
A fourth category of considerations that affects the magnitude of 
duty is the source of legal action under which an alleged breach of duty is 
asserted. Legal claims alleging a breach of fiduciary duty arise under a 
large number of legal bases, including federal statutes, such as ERISA, 
state statutes, such as corporate codes, and under the common law, 
where fiduciary relationships are a long-standing feature of equity. 
In general, actions under federal statutes will have higher degrees of 
duty compared with actions brought under state statutes, and actions 
brought pursuant to statutory enactment will carry higher degrees of 
duty than actions brought under the common law. This is of course an 
oversimplification, but as a general guidepost it is nevertheless somewhat 
helpful in assessing the likelihood that a fiduciary will be held to a 
relatively high or low degree of duty. 
We would expect that in the educational context the degree of duty 
imposed on fiduciaries will vary based upon the underlying legal source 
of the claim. The most likely underlying legal claim will be based upon 
the common law standards applicable to fiduciaries, which often result in 
relatively low magnitudes of duty. 
B. Quantifying the Magnitude of an Alleged Breach of Duty 
Thus far, our analysis has identified a range of factors-including the 
characteristics of the fiduciary, the characteristics of the beneficiary, the 
characteristics of the subject matter, and the source of the legal action-
that affect the magnitude of duty that will exist in a particular case or 
situation. 
The second step in analyzing the magnitude of fiduciary duties and 
their breaches assesses the performance of the fiduciary, and seeks to 
measure to extent to which the fiduciary has either exceeded or fallen 
short in the expected standard of performance of her duties. Just as the 
magnitude of duty varies based upon a variety of factors, the magnitude 
of an alleged breach also varies. As one might expect, there are a variety 
of factors relevant to an assessment of a fiduciary's performance. Also as 
might be expected, when a high magnitude duty exists, a higher standard 
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of performance will be required in order to satisfy or meet that duty. On 
the other hand, if the magnitude of duty in a particular situation is 
relatively low, then the expectations of the fiduciary will be lower and the 
degree of performance required in order to satisfy that duty will be more 
modest. While a particular standard of performance may be sufficient to 
clear the bar in the case of a relatively low level duty, the same standard 
of performance may be insufficient in the case of relatively high 
magnitude duty. 
In assessing a fiduciary's performance, there are four general 
categories of considerations that courts take into account: (i) the 
character of the harm suffered; (ii) the character of the fiduciary's 
deliberative process; (iii) the character of the fiduciary's motives; and (iv) 
the classification of the alleged breach of duty. 
I. Character and Extent of the Harm Suffered 
The first factor courts consider in quantifying the magnitude of an 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty is the character of the harm suffered. 
Courts are likely to view high magnitude losses as evidence of a high 
magnitude breach of duty and of a low level of performance by the 
fiduciary. In contrast, small magnitude losses are likely to be considered 
evidence of only small magnitude breaches, or even no breach of duty. If 
the harm suffered by the beneficiary is relatively small, then even a 
degree of performance by a fiduciary that might be somewhat deficient 
may not result in liability. On the other hand, if the harm suffered is of a 
high magnitude, then a similar standard of performance by a fiduciary 
might result in liability. In assessing the character and extent of harm 
suffered, courts focus on several different dimensions of harm, including 
the magnitude of loss or harm, the breadth of loss or harm, and the 
frequency of the loss or harm. 
a. Magnitude of the Loss or Harm 
Loss of Life: (numerous, several, one). At one end of the 
spectrum of magnitude of loss or harm is loss of life. If many 
lives are lost, courts may view the degree of breach as being 
especially high. When such a high magnitude loss occurs, courts 
will often find liability even if the degree of duty owed was quite 
modest.00 This is because a very low degree of performance (i.e., a 
90. See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns o(Amcrica, Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Ariz. 19'10) (holding 
a hotel liable l(rr 1;1iling to warn independent contractor security guard of a robbery on the premises 
when the robber returned and shot and killed the security guard); Maurer v. Cerkvenik-Andcrson 
"Fravel, Inc., 890 P.2d 6'1 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1994) (holding travel agency liable for breaching duty to 
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very high magnitude breach of duty) will not be sufficient to 
clear even a relatively low level duty. We would expect that in the 
educational context, when students die as a result of the 
negligence or failures of oversight of teachers or administrators, 
there is a relatively high likelihood that a court might find a 
breach of duty. If the loss of life is due to affirmative malfeasance 
on the part of a teacher or other fiduciary, this will be viewed as 
an even higher magnitude breach, and the likelihood of liability 
will be even greater. If the risk of loss was foreseeable or could 
have easily been avoided, then this factor will likewise amplify 
the magnitude of breach and make liability for a breach of duty 
more likely. 
• Physical or Emotional Injury: (large, medium, small). The 
magnitude of loss will also be very high in the event of serious 
physical or emotional injury.Y 1 Physical and emotional injuries 
can occur along a spectrum of seriousness, and the greater the 
quantum of injury suffered by a beneficiary or beneficiaries, the 
more likely a fiduciary will be held to have violated a duty. On 
the other hand, if the degree of injury is relatively small, it 
becomes decreasingly likely that a court will consider there to 
have been a high magnitude breach of duty. We would expect 
that the magnitude of physical or emotional injury suffered by 
students could be an important factor in assessing the magnitude 
of breach of duty in the educational context. For example, a 
teacher involved in sexual misconduct with students, especially 
young students, will likely be liable.92 Some especially high 
magnitude breaches of duty, including sexual relations with a 
minor, are proscribed by criminal law. As a result, the equitable 
warn of known dangers in selling its tour when student traveler wa.s killed during train ride to 
,'v1exico); lluncavagc v. Allen, ·197 N.F.2d 433 (Ill. App. 1st J)ist. ll)H6) (holding a landlord liable for 
breaching his duty to maintain the safety of the premise.s when a woman was rc1ped and murdered in 
the residence by an intruder). 
91. Sec lla!Jiin v. Evangcliml Child & Fam. Agcn<y, 2S2 F. Supp. 2d 666, 66lJ (1'\.ll. Ill. 20112) 
(finding plaintitls claim {(Jr injuries to their l:1mily and emotional distress overcame a motion to 
disrni" by dekndant adoption agency which failed to disclose full information about the adopted 
child who later exhibited major emotional problems); Markowitz v. Arizona /'arks /3d., 706 P.2d 367, 
371 (Ariz. l'JH5) (holding a state has a duty to take reasonable precaution tn avoid injury to invitees 
in recreational area when boy was seriously injured a tier diving into shallow water); Doc v. Roc, 6H 1 
N.E.2d 640, 045~46 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1997) (permitting plaintiff to pursue damages for mental 
distress when her attorney breached his fiduciary duty by using his position as altorncv and his 
knowledge of client's dependence upon him to gain sexual favors). 
92. Sec e.g. State v. Oddi, 2002 Ohio 5926 (Ohio App. 5th D1st. 2002) (upholding the gmss 
sexual imposition conviction of a driver's education teacher who fondled studenh who were minors 
(cited in ,\'tate v. Clay, 2005 WL 17S85 at '3 (Ohio App.'Jth Dist. jan. 5, 2005))); State v. liairJcv, 2003 
vVL 213029l)3 (Tenn. Crim. App. june 6, 2003) (upholding the conviction of a principal, who also 
served as the girl's basketball coach, on seven counts of sexual battery by an ,lllthority Cigure and 
eleven counts of statutory rape t(lr his sexual relationship with a tenth grade student). 
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principles used in assessing an alleged violation of fiduciary duty 
may not be directly implicated, but if a claim were mounted 
under the rubric of fiduciary duty (such as in a civil suit against 
the teacher or school district), the high magnitude injury would 
often be an important consideration in the decision to hold a 
teacher or other fiduciary liable.93 
• Loss of Wealth: (large, medium, small, de minimis). In general, 
monetary loss will exist somewhat further down the continuum 
of loss. As might be expected, however, the amount of money 
lost will be directly relevant to an assessment of the magnitude of 
loss. If fiduciary conduct results in a significant loss of wealth, it 
is more likely that a court will find a high magnitude breach of 
duty, whereas small losses are more likely to trigger a finding of 
low-degree breaches of duty, or even a finding that there has 
been no breach of duty.94 If monetary stewardship lies at the 
center of a fiduciary's responsibilities, then monetary loss is more 
likely to be deemed a high-degree breach of duty. But if 
monetary loss is modest, or de minimis, even seemingly 
egregious failures by a fiduciary may not result in liability, 
especially if such failures are matters of carelessness rather than 
self-dealing.95 Given the nature of the fiduciary entrustment of 
teachers, we would not expect monetary loss to be a common 
feature of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. We would expect, 
however, that issues involving assertions of financial impropriety 
might be more common in the case of administrators with 
responsibility over significant budgets. In such cases, we would 
expect the magnitude of monetary loss to be relevant to a 
determination of whether there has been a breach of fiduciary 
duty, perhaps not so much as a matter of principle as a matter of 
expediency. 
195 
93. Doc v. City of New Orleans, 577 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 
school board could be found liable for the sexual molestation of a nine-year-old student in a school 
restroom during school hours by an unknown man, even though no liability was imposed on the 
teacher who allowed the student to go to the restroom by her;elf, because board had the duty to 
promulgate official policy against allowing young children to leave the classroom alone during 
school hours). 
94. See Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d 652, 655 
(E.D. Va. 2002) (upholding claim for breach of fiduciary duty of investment banking firm whose 
abuse of the fiduciary relationship and misappropriation of confidential business information 
resulted in plaintiffs "sutlering significant financial losses"). 
95. If no loss results from a breach, then no monetary liability exists. See Roth v. Sawyer-
Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 920 (8th Cir. 1994); Friend v. Sanwa Bank Cal., 35 F.3d 466, 469 
(9th C:ir. 1994); Ironworkers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 695 F.2d 531,536 (11th C:ir. 1983) (where loss 
existed but did not result from alleged breach). 
.l.7U V.1.U. LLJU\..,.1>11\Jl'; nnu L.t>VV JVUI\.l';.l>L ]L.VVJ 
b. Breadth of Loss or Harm 
• Number of People Harmed: (large, medium, small, single 
individual). In general, if a large number of people are harmed, it 
is more likely that a court will find a high magnitude breach of 
duty. Especially in cases involving a small magnitude of harm, 
such as relatively small per share stockholder losses, if the loss 
affects a large number of people the likelihood of liability is 
heightened. In general, if a small number of people suffer harm 
as a result of a fiduciary's alleged misconduct, it will be less likely 
that a court will find a breach of fiduciary duty. If, however, a 
small number of people, or even a single individual, suffers a very 
high magnitude of harm, this may be sufficient to trigger liability 
and the limited breadth of the harm will not serve to vindicate 
the fiduciary. 96 We would expect this general pattern to apply in 
the educational context. If large numbers of students are harmed, 
then a smaller per-student quantum of harm might be required 
before liability is imposed.97 If a small number of students are 
harmed, we would expect that a larger quantum of per-student 
harm would be required before a court will find liability. 
c. Frequency of the Harm Suffered 
How Often Harm Suffered: (continuous, ongoing, frequent, 
periodic, occasional, isolated incident). If the harm suffered is 
continuous or ongoing, it is more likely that a court will find a 
high magnitude of breach of fiduciary duty than if the harm is 
only occasional or limited to an isolated incident.n To be sure, if 
harm is of a high magnitude, the fact that it occurred only once 
96. See supra, nn. 90-97 and accompanying text for discussion of the magnitude of the loss or 
harm. 
97. Sec Deitsch v. Tillery, 833 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. 1992) (holding that parents of students at an 
elementary school stated a claim of negligence against the school district, school board, and school 
employees f(lr negligence which resulted in exposure to asbestos). 
<JR. See Riverside Auto Sales, Inc. v. GE Capital Warranty Corp., 2004 WI. 2106638 '7 (W.D. 
Mich. Mar. 30, 2004) (finding that "[w]hether [defendant] wrongfully removed fees each month may 
be <ln issue to consider with respect to Plaintiffs' breach of tlduciary duty or breach of contract 
claims"); Apollo Technologies Corp. v. Centrosphere Indus. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1157, 1199-1200 
(D.\\'.). 1992) (denying preliminary injunctive relief on breach offiduciary duty claim because there 
was no longer an ongoing harm to corporation, yet tlnding that the corporation demonstrated the 
likelihood of success on the merits of its breach of fiduciary duty claim arising from Centrosphere 
continuing to hold itself out as Apollo's agent after the expiration of the agency relationship). Harris 
v. Archer, 134 S.W.3d 422, 438 (Tex. App. 7th Dis!. 2004) (finding that although a partner\ breach of 
fiduciary duty was "reprehensible" because it was "an intentional action intended to gain a benellt 
for himself," the breach was not "particularly egregious" for purposes of determining punitive 
damages because it was an isolated incident, the harm was only economic, and the harmed partner 
was not in a position of vulnerability). 
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or infrequently will not serve as a persuasive basis for forestalling 
liability. In general, however, if the harm is frequent or ongoing, 
even if the harm is of a relatively low magnitude, the high 
frequency will serve as a basis for magnifying the breach of duty. 
We would expect this pattern to apply in the usual fashion in the 
educational context, with frequent breaches of high magnitude 
duties being the most likely to result in liability. 
• Duration of Alleged Breach: (longstanding, moderate, brief). A 
factor closely related to but distinct from frequency of harm is 
the duration of when the harm occurs. In general, breaches of an 
extended duration are more likely to be considered a high 
magnitude breach of duty than are breaches of short duration. 
For example, a trustee that has engaged in a long pattern of 
monetary expropriations is more likely to be found liable than a 
trustee who can plausibly claim that a single exceptional instance 
of misconduct was a mistake or oversight that should not result 
in liability.99 As is the case with frequency, however, the fact of 
short duration may not serve as a basis for forestalling liability in 
the case of a severe breach. In the educational context, we would 
expect that if a pattern of fiduciary misconduct extends over a 
long period of time, it is more likely that a court will find a 
breach of duty. This factor is most likely to be relevant in 
instances of relatively low-level breaches of duty, which come to 
be viewed as significant due to their chronic nature. 
2. Character of the Fiduciary's Deliberative Process 
197 
A second set of factors that will affect a determination of the 
magnitude of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty is the nature and 
character of the fiduciary's deliberative process. In general, the greater 
the defects in a fiduciary or a group of fiduciaries' deliberative process 
the greater the likelihood that a court will find a high magnitude breach 
of duty, whereas an adequate or, better yet, admirable deliberative 
process will make it more likely that even in the event of an unfortunate 
outcome a court will find a low magnitude breach, if indeed it finds any 
breach at all. If the character and process of deliberation is sufficient, 
fiduciaries will be insulated from liability even in thl face of many 
99. See Production Resources Group, L.LC. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, S00-01 (Del. 
Ch. 2004) (refusing to dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim because "the unusual pattern of 
conduct is suggestive of injury to NCT as a finn" and "a suspicious pattern of dealing ... raises the 
legitimate concern that the NCr board is not pursuing the best interests of NCT's creditors as a 
class"); Beacon Hill CBO, Ud. v. Beacon Hill Asset, 314 F Supp. 2d 205,210 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding 
that plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of tlduciary duty through the assertion that defendant 
violated fiduciary duties through a "systematic pattern of mi>eonduct"). 
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failings in outcome. The character of the deliberative process will be 
particularly important in situations involving business decisions or other 
discretionary decisions that affect the monetary status of beneficiaries. 
For example, courts often scrutinize the deliberative processes of 
corporate directors, money managers, and trustees who have investment 
discretion over client funds. The deliberative process is likely to be of 
heightened importance when decisions are made collectively by a group 
of fiduciaries. There are several sub-factors relevant to an assessment of 
deliberative process, including the character of deliberations and the 
diligence with which they are conducted, the quality and quantity of 
information upon which a decision was based, the character and 
consistency of fiduciaries' recollections and accounts of a collective 
deliberative process, and whether alternatives other than the ultimate 
course of action were analyzed and considered. 
a. Character of Deliberations/Diligence 
• Length: (long, medium, short; many occasions, several 
occasions, one occasion). In general, lengthy deliberations are 
more likely to result in a court finding a low-magnitude breach, 
or no breach, of fiduciary duty, even when things turn out badly, 
whereas short or perfunctory deliberations may result in a 
finding of a breach, possibly even a high magnitude breach, of 
duty, even when things arguably turn out well. In general, when 
important decisions are at stake, such as a board of directors' 
decision to sell a company, longer and multiple deliberations will 
be viewed more favorably by courts than shorter or one-time 
deliberations. 1110 What constitutes an adequate length of 
deliberation varies significantly based upon the nature of the 
decision and the environment in which the decision is made. If 
there are factors which make urgent action necessary, it is less 
likely that a court will fault fiduciaries for not engaging in 
lengthy deliberations. If on the other hand, time is not of the 
essence in making a decision, or if the sense of emergency is 
artificial or manufactured, then it is less likely that the perceived 
100. Sec Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. WHX Corp., 967 f. Supp. 59,()() (D. Conn. 1997) (finding no 
breach of fiduciary duty in the manner in which the Board reached its decisions because "[e[ach of 
the Board's decisions was made deliberately, after extensive discussion and consideration of tbe 
advice of its financial and legal advosors and consideration of a range of alternative strategies"); 
Lewis v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1996) (holding that no fiduciary 
duty had been breached because the board spent a considerable amount of time studying and 
digesting the plan); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Dei. Super. 1985) (holding that board 
breached its fiduciary duty of care because its approval of the sale of the company on two hours 
consideration without prior notice did not satisfy its duty to act with informed reasonable 
deliberation). 
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emergency will be seen as a valid reason for foreclosing or 
shortening deliberations. A court's assessment of the adequacy of 
deliberations will also be affected by notification and preparation 
for deliberating an important matter. For example, if a board of 
directors is going to deliberate a proposed sale or merger of their 
company, and they have advance notice and detailed information 
about a proposed transaction, it is more likely that their 
deliberations will be deemed adequate. 101 If on the other hand, 
the board hears about a proposed transaction for the first time at 
the meeting at which the transaction is ultimately approved, then 
it is more likely that a court will find fault with the character of 
their deliberations. In the educational context, a court would 
likely look to faculty meetings, formulation of school policies, 
conferral with colleagues, etc. to determine the length of 
deliberations. 
• Character: (solemn, serious, casual, flippant; multiple options 
considered, several options, single option; high participation, 
medium participation, low participation; active questioning, 
moderate questioning, low questioning, no questioning; in 
person, on phone, absent). The character and seriousness of 
deliberations will also be relevant to a determination whether 
there has been a high or low magnitude breach of duty. 
Deliberations that are active as opposed to passive will be less 
likely to result in liability. 1112 Deliberations in which only one 
option is considered will be more likely to result in liability than 
deliberations in which the respective merits of a variety of 
options are debated. 1113 If deliberations are ad hoc or 
uninformed, 104 if written materials have not been prepared in 
advance, 10" if the majority of participants are on the phone rather 
199 
llll. I"cwis, 664 l\i.F.2d at 135 (finding no breach of fiduciary duty by Board members in part 
because "[p[rior to the meeting they received a dc\ailed, thirty-four page memorandum explaining 
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed plan"). 
102. Sec e.g Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 574 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding breach of 
fiduciary duty in part because "the evidence shows that tbe remaining directors passively allowed 
Walden-the fiduciary having the strongest conflicting interest-to dominate the decision making 
proce" with the result that the outcome was favorable to him"). 
103. Sec e.g J)ux Capital Mgt. v. Chen, 2004 WL 1936309 at '11 (N.D. Cal. Aug 31, 2004) 
(finding breach of fiduciary duty in part because defendants failed to duly consider other alternatives 
to bankruptcy); Strassburger, 752 A.2d at 573-74 (holding that corporation's board of directors 
breached fiduciary duties in part because "the evidence docs not support the contention that the 
board seriously considered the alternatives to a repurchase, and to the extent that alternatives were 
(in fact) r\liscd, they were quickly brushed aside because [the director with the strongest conflicting 
interest] disfanned them"). 
IIH. Infra nn. 106-113, and accompanying text. 
1115. Sec e.g In rc Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., H25 A.2d at 275, 287 (finding lack of 
businc,, judgment where directors neither received nor attempted to review actual draft 
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than present in person, if a large number of participants are 
missing, or if memories of deliberations are sketchy and vague-
these sorts of factors increase the likelihood that a court will find 
a breach of fiduciary duty. 
• Consultations with Experts: (meaningful, pro forma, non-
existent). One way in which fiduciaries can decrease the 
likelihood of being found in violation of their fiduciary duties is 
by consulting with relevant experts before making a decision. 10" 
On the other hand, the failure to consult experts when doing so 
would enhance the likelihood of making a good decision can be a 
factor in finding a breach of duty. 107 The qualifications and 
reputation of the experts, their level of preparation and 
thoroughness, and the quality of their written and oral materials 
and presentations will also affect the degree of deference that a 
court is willing to give to a fiduciary's or group fiduciaries' 
deliberations. 
b. Information upon Which an Action was Based 
• Quality: (high, medium, low). If important decisions are based 
upon information of a high quality, it is less likely that a court 
will find a breach of fiduciary duty than if decisions are based 
upon information of poor quality. 10H 
• Quantity: (highly informed, somewhat informed, anecdotal, ad 
hoc, uninformed; written materials (detailed, somewhat detailed, 
not detailed; accurate, somewhat accurate, inaccurate; complete, 
mostly complete, incomplete)). Similarly, the sheer quantity of 
employment agreements but rather received merely a summary of terms and conditions, and where 
there was no further board or committee review of the final agreement which "differed substantially 
from the original draft"). 
106. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 261 (Del. Super. 2000) (finding that directors did not 
breach their fiduciary duty in creati1.5 a compensation package for the president partially because 
they relied on an outside executive search consultant); Lewis, 664 N.E.2d at 134 (finding no breach of 
fiduciary duty in part because the Board solicited the advice of its law firm and its broker, and 
"[b]oth recommended the plan that the board ultimately adopted"). 
107. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d at 288 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that 
directors and president breached fiduciary duties in dealing with the president's employment 
contract and non-fault termination, emphasizing that "no expert was retained to advise the Old 
Board, the committee, or [the CEO]"). 
108. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10-12 (Del. Super. 1998) (holding that "directors who 
knowingly disseminate false information that results in corporate injury or damage to an individual 
stockholder violate their fiduciary duty"); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1127-28 (Del. C:h. 
1999) (finding that "courts inquire as to the type and quality of inf(Jrmation in shareholders' hands 
prior to the vote" in determining whether directors have complied with their duty to disclose all 
material information, when they are seeking the affirmative vote of shareholders, such that 
shareholders are "fully informed"). 
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information can also make a difference in an assessment of 
whether fiduciaries have fulfilled their duties. In general, a 
greater amount of information taken into account will decrease 
the likelihood of liability. 109 
• Time to Study and Digest: (ample, adequate, minimal, 
inadequate). In general, if fiduciaries have had ample time to 
study and digest information, especially if it is of a complex and 
multifaceted nature, it is less likely that a court will find them to 
be in violation of fiduciary duties, including the duties of 
diligence and care. 110 On the other hand, if complex or difficult 
decisions are made hastily, without adequate time to study and 
digest relevant information, it is more likely that a court will find 
a breach of duty. 111 
• Due Diligence: (thorough, adequate, cursory, nonexistent). 
When important discretionary decisions are being made, 
fiduciaries are expected to conduct an investigation of a 
proposed course of action, often referred to as conducting due 
diligence. 112 If a fiduciary fails to conduct adequate due 
diligence, it increases the likelihood that a court will find a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 113 
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109. See e.g. Lewis v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 664 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1996) (finding 
no breach of fiduciary duty when the evidence clearly demonstrated that "the Board considered 
several alternatives in addition to the plan and that it had a substantial amount of outside 
information and counsel from both the law firm and the investment banking groups" (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
110. See Gray v. Zondervan Corp., 712 F. Supp. 1275, 1280-82 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that 
directors of target corporation did not breach their fiduciary duties to shareholders because decision 
to recommend acceptance of lock-up, topping, and expense fees and employment contracts was 
made by a committee of outside directors after substantial deliberation and extensive input from 
financial and legal experts). 
Ill. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d at 287-88 (finding breach of fiduciary 
duty when compensation committee and Board spent a fraction of an hour deliberating and asked no 
questions about the proposed employment contract of the prospective new president). 
112. Uss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that defendants' omissions, 
including failure to properly investigate investments and failure to exercise due diligence, constituted 
a "prototype for breached fiduciary duty"). 
113. See e.g. Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 124 (7th Cir. 1984) (failing to make an intensive and 
independent investigation of investment options constitutes breach of fiduciary duty); Keach v. U.S. 
Trust Co., N.A., 256 f. Supp. 2d 840,842 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (upholding claim of breach of fiduciary duty 
since evidence "could support the reasonable inference that [defendant's] due diligence 
investigations failed to rise to the level of prudence necessary to insulate it from liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty"). 
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c. Consistency of Fiduciaries' Memories and Accounts of Decision 
Making 
• Degree of Consistency and Detail: (high, medium, low; 
documented, vaguely documented, undocumented). Fiduciaries 
are often required to give an account of the process they engaged 
in when making important decisions. If a fiduciary or group of 
fiduciaries have a clear, detailed, recollection of the decision-
making process, and if the relevant accounts are consistent with 
each other, it decreases the likelihood that a court will find that 
there has been a breach of duty. Documentation to support such 
recollections, such as detailed board minutes, or written 
materials from presentations about a proposed course of action, 
will also decrease the likelihood of liability. On the other hand, if 
a fiduciary has very little detailed recollection, or if individual 
members of a group of fiduciaries do not remember details, or if 
memories are vague or inconsistent, it increases the likelihood 
that a court will find a breach of duty. 114 
d. Consideration of Alternatives 
• Alternatives Considered: (multiple, several, two, one). When 
important discretionary decisions are subject to scrutiny, if a 
fiduciary or group of fiduciaries has actively considered a range 
of alternative courses of action, as opposed to only one or two 
favored options, it increases the likelihood that a court will not 
find a breach of duty. 115 On the other hand, if deliberations were 
limited to a single possible course of action, or if only one option 
was seriously considered, it is more likely that a court will find a 
breach of duty. 116 
Actions Taken to Foreclose Alternatives: (high prohibitive 
effect, medium, low). Sometimes a fiduciary or group of 
fiduciaries will take affirmative actions to foreclose alternatives 
114. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Utig., H25 A.2d at 2H'J (refusing to grant din•c\ors 
protection under the business judgment rule in part because there was no evidence in the hoard 
meeting minutes that the directors seriously undertook their duty to consider the terms or the 
president's hiring and subsequent termination, giving the impression that the direc\or.s "consciously 
and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities" (emphasis removed)). 
115. See Lewis v. Playboy Hnterprises. Inc., 664 N.~ . .2d 13J, 134 (Ill i\pp ht Dist. llJ'.Ih) 
(finding no breach of fiduciary duty in part became "!s]enior management considered l()l]r different 
restructuring transactions"). 
116. See Strassburger v. Harley, 752 A.2d at 573-74 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that corporation's 
board of directors breached fiduciary duties in part because "the evidence docs not "'ppurt the 
contention that the board seriously considered the alternatives to a rcpurcha"'· and to the extent that 
alternatives were (in fact) raised, they were quickly brmhcd aside"). 
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that might be in the best interest of beneficiaries, which will 
increase the likelihood that a court will find a breach of fiduciary 
duty. For example, if a board of directors that has decided to sell 
the company takes actions to foreclose higher potential 
competing bids, this will increase the likelihood that a court will 
find the board liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. 117 
3. Character of the Fiduciary's Motives 
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An important third set of factors that courts utilize in assessing the 
magnitude of an alleged breach of duty centers around the fiduciary's 
motives. In general, questionable or unacceptable motives increase the 
likelihood of a court finding a breach of duty, and salutary or 
unassailable motives increase the likelihood of a court finding no breach 
of duty. Improper motives, such as greed, also exist along a continuum, 
and the more unacceptable the motive, the more likely it is that a high 
magnitude breach will be found. In addition, and perhaps less intuitively 
obvious, inappropriate motives themselves exist along a spectrum, with 
greed, self-dealing, disloyalty, and conflicts of interest, for example, being 
more problematic than anger, fear, laziness or inattentiveness. Of course, 
high magnitude instances of even the less objectionable motives can 
result in liability, such as when negligence rises to the level of 
recklessness or gross negligence, or when carelessness rises to the level of 
abdication. Problematic motives often combine with other defects in the 
fiduciary's behavior or performance, in which case courts sometimes 
treat them as something like an aggravating factor in increasing the 
magnitude of a breach. 
a. Conflicts of Interest 
Fiduciaries are expected to act exclusively in the interests and for the 
benefit of their beneficiaries. 11 H In Judge Cardozo's memorable 
117. See Roth v. Mims, 298 B.R. 272, 285-86 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that president breached 
fiduciary duty of care to corporation under Texas law by failing to diligently market corporation's 
assets and seek out potential buyers because, even though president did not preclude other buyers 
from making competing offers, he did not take affirmative steps to market the corporation's assets 
other than to the company who secretly negotiated with the president). 
118. See Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000) ('"Perhaps the most fundamental duty of 
a trustee is that he must display throughout the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the 
interests of the beneficiary and must exclude all selfish interest and all consideration of the interesb 
of third persons."' (quoting (;eorge Gleason Bogart & George Taylor Bogert, The l.aw of Trusts and 
Trustees§ 543, 217 (2d ed., West 1984))); Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546 ("Many t(Jrms of conduct 
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by 
fiduciary tit,. A trustee is held to s0mething stricter than the morals of the market plan.' .... Not 
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."). 
formulation fiduciaries owe an "undivided loyalty" and a "punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive." 11 Y Contlicts of interest take many forms and 
are condemned under a variety of doctrinal rubrics including the duties 
of loyalty and good faith, prohibitions on self-dealing and self-
enrichment, and the corporate opportunities doctrine. 
• Selfish Motives/Greed: (high, medium, low; dominant motive, 
intermediate degree motive, insignificant motive). One of the 
ways that a fiduciary will most dramatically increase the 
likelihood that a court will find her liable for a breach of 
fiduciary duty is to act from selfish motives. 120 Greed is probably 
the predominant selfish motive that results in a finding that a 
fiduciary has breached her duty. Greed may or may not be good 
when an individual is acting in pursuit of her own conception of 
her own self-interest, but is almost always an unacceptable 
motive in a fiduciary. An exception exists in cases where there is 
a close alignment of the fiduciary's interests and the 
beneficiaries' interests, such as is often the case of directors and 
their corporations. But greedy fiduciaries often act in ways that 
create dissonance between their interests and their beneficiaries' 
interest, in which case a court is likely to find a breach of duty. 
Selfish motives will be evaluated according to their magnitude, as 
well as their relative place among other motives. Not 
surprisingly, courts are more likely to find legal liability in cases 
involving high-magnitude selfishness as opposed to lower-
magnitude selfishness, which may result in only indignant 
disapproval or acquiescence. For example, a fiduciary may have a 
plausible argument that her interests and the beneficiary's 
interests were closely aligned, and even there are grounds for 
doubting the fiduciary's assertion, a court may be reluctant to 
conclude that the fiduciary has breached her duty. Since 
educators do not generally have a financial stewardship, we 
would not expect that greed would not be a dominant factor in 
assessing the magnitude of duty in the educational context. But if 
educators act in a greedy or self-serving manner, for example by 
trying to take credit for a student's research or invention, the 
119. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546. 
120. See Renz v. Beeman, 589 F.2d 735,747 12d Cir. 1978) ("To upset the balance of control for 
selfish gain is to commit a breach of the high fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty."); People v. 
Bmzrnan, 901 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Colo. 1995) (finding that since "the respondent's breach of his 
fiduciary duty to his clients was in large part motivated by greed," mitigating factors did not apply 
and that such greed was in fact an aggravating factor); O'Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 100, 112 
(Ill. App. 5th Dist. 2002) (holding that an insurer acted in bad faith because "corporate greed 
motivated [the insurer's] breach of fiduciary duty and that its greed was pervasive," deliberate, and 
routine). 
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fiduciary's greed could be a contributing factor in assessing the 
degree of a breach of duty. 121 
• Self-Enrichment: (significant, moderate, small, de minimis). 
Closely related to greed is self-enrichment. One of the particular 
ways in which a fiduciary can increase the likelihood of liability 
for breaching her fiduciary duty is to enrich herself at the 
expense of the beneficiary. 122 For example, when a director 
approves the sale of a company, but receives a lucrative severance 
package or consulting contract, this can create a private benefit 
that does not accrue to all shareholders, which will increase the 
likelihood that the director will be found liable for a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Self-enrichment will likely be viewed as a higher-
magnitude breach if it takes place covertly, in which case the 
likelihood ofliability is increased. 123 
• Corporate Opportunities: (secretive, partial disclosure, full 
disclosure, full disclosure and authorization). Another type of 
conflict of interest arises when a fiduciary appropriates for 
himself an opportunity that would be of interest to his 
beneficiaries. A fiduciary is generally forbidden to take for 
himself an opportunity that would be of interest to his 
beneficiaries, without first presenting the opportunity to the 
beneficiaries, having the beneficiary pass on the opportunity, and 
giving the fiduciary permission to pursue it privately. 121 For 
example, a partner who, upon receiving a very lucrative 
engagement, immediately decides to resign from the partnership 
121. See infra Part IV (B)-( C). 
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122. See e.g. Beckstrom v. Parnell, 730 So. 2d 942, 948 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998) (holding that 
stockholder breached his fiduciary duty to investor through self-dealing, which was held to the 
"higher degree of loyalty owed by a fiduciary"). 
123. See e.g. Ries v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 1995 WL 669583 at '7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1995) 
("A fiduciary's covert protlteering at the expense of insureds is inconsistent with its duties of acting 
'solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,' and of refraining !rom engaging in self~ 
dealing. Moreover, the failure to inform [plaintiff] of the discounting arrangement transgresses the 
t!duciary duty of conveying important information and ensuring against misleading plan 
participants." (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(A))). 
124. See In re Sullivan, 305 B.R. 809, 819-20 (Bankr. W.O. Mich. 2004) ('"It is widely 
recognized that the appropriation of a corporate opportunity by an oftlcer or director' constitutes a 
breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith .... 'A corporate officer or director is under a fiduciary 
obligation not to divert a corporate business opportunity for his own personal gain. The rule is that if 
there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the corporation is 
financially able to undertake which is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation's business and is 
of practical advantage to it, and which is one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable 
expectancy, and if, by embracing the opportunity, the self interest of the officer or director will be 
brought into conflict with that of this corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the 
opportunity for himself."' (quoting Prod. Finishing Corp. v. Shields, 405 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Mich. 
App. 1987))). 
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and pursue the opportunity for himself is guilty of expropriating 
a partnership opportunity. When assessing whether an 
opportunity was a corporate or partnership opportunity, a court 
will consider the line of business in which the corporation or 
partnership is engaged and how closely the opportunity is 
aligned with the corporation or partnership's business. 125 A court 
will also consider whether the partnership is a term partnership, 
or an at will partnership. If it is a term partnership, and the term 
of the partnership has expired, then an opportunity that does not 
arise until the expiration of the term may not be viewed as a 
partnership opportunity. As the Meinhard case illustrates, 
however, a fiduciary's self-serving characterization of when an 
opportunity arises may be rejected by a court. 126 We would not 
expect the corporate opportunities doctrine to be a significant 
theory of liability in the educational context. But if, for example, 
a group of educators were working together in a partnership, and 
if one of the partners were accused of seizing for himself an 
opportunity that would have been of interest to the partnership, 
then we would expect such behavior to be analyzed in the usual 
manner. 
• Anger, Hatred, Jealousy, Animus: (high, medium, low). 
Conflicts of interest can manifest themselves in less 
straightforward ways as well, including when a fiduciary acts out 
of passion or animus, rather than out of a careful evaluation of 
the best interests of the beneficiaries. Greed is not the only 
emotion that can create a conflict of interest between a fiduciary 
and his beneficiaries. For example, if a fiduciary acts out of 
anger, hatred, or vengeance (among other inappropriate 
emotions), even if there is no economic self-dealing, a court may 
conclude that the fiduciary has violated fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and good faith by engaging in a type of self-dealing. 127 We would 
expect this factor to apply in the usual manner in the educational 
context. 
125. See Gen. Automotive Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659 (Wis. 1963). 
126. JV!einhard, 164 N.E. at 550 (Andrews, j. dissenting) (characterizing the original lease as 
creating a relationship analogous to a term partnership). 
127. See In rc R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 1989 WI. 7036 at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 
1989) (finding that "the protections of the business judgment rule would /not] be available to a 
fiduciary who could be shown to have caused a transaction to be effectuated . . for a reason 
unrelated to a pursuit of the corporation's best interests" and that "[g]reed is not the only human 
emotion that can pull one from the path of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, or .. 
shame or pride"). 
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c. Fear 
Fiduciaries who are paralyzed by fear increase the likelihood of being 
found liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. On the other hand, fiduciaries 
who are extremely fearless, as manifested, for example, by an extreme 
toleration or appetite for risk, are also likely to be found in violation of 
their fiduciary duty. Fear can manifest itself in a variety of ways, 
including an extreme aversion to making a mistake, or concern about 
being found out, which may result in hiding mistakes. 
• Extreme A version to or Appetite for Risk: (extremely cautions, 
moderately cautious, appropriately cautions, moderately risky, 
extremely risky). A fiduciary can breach his fiduciary duty both 
by being too risk averse and by having too great an appetite for 
risk. If a fiduciary has an unusual and unwarranted aversion to 
risk and as a result fails to take advantage of opportunities that a 
prudent person would take advantage of, this will increase the 
likelihood that a court will find a breach of fiduciary duty. On the 
other hand, if a fiduciary has an inappropriately large appetite or 
tolerance for risk, this also can increase the likelihood that a 
court will find a breach of duty. What constitutes an appropriate 
degree of risk aversion will vary significantly based upon a 
number of contextual considerations including the character of 
the beneficiary, and the goals and expectations of the beneficiary. 
For example, the types and degree of risks that are appropriate 
when investing the retirement funds of someone who is only a 
few years from retirement will be significantly different than the 
types and degree of risks that are appropriate for someone who is 
still several decades away from retirement. In both contexts, 
however, there will be a continuum, with types of behavior that 
are too risk averse and other types of behavior that embrace too 
much risk. Since educators are for the most part not fiduciaries 
with oversight responsibility for investing money, we would not 
expect this factor to be of particular significance in the 
educational context. 
• Hiding Mistakes: (systematic, ongoing, occasional, one time). 
Another type of fear that may result in a court viewing a breach 
of duty as being of a heightened magnitude is when a fiduciary 
makes a mistake and does not want it to be discovered. If a 
fiduciary tries to hide or cover up mistakes, this will increase the 
likelihood that a court will find the underlying mistake to be a 
high -degree breach of duty, and the act of hiding the mistake will 
act as a magnifying factor. 1:>x Not surprisingly, systematic or 
12H. Sec Lasley v. Helms, XRO P.2d 1135, 1137-38 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 l<J<J·l) (holding that a 
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ongoing hiding of mistakes is more likely to be characterized as a 
high magnitude breach than hiding that is an exception to a 
general pattern of candor and disclosure, or that represents a 
one-time lapse. We would expect that this factor would apply in 
the usual manner in the educational context. 
d. Laziness or Inattentiveness 
Degree of Carelessness: (willful blindness, gross negligence, 
negligence, care, diligence). A fiduciary can increase the 
likelihood of liability for breach of fiduciary duty by being lazy, 
inattentive, or careless. The greater the degree of negligence, the 
greater the likelihood that a fiduciary will be found in breach of 
duty. Usually the threshold of carelessness is quite high before 
liability will exist. For example courts require gross negligence or 
reckless disregard of important information to trigger fiduciary 
liability rather than simple negligence, but if negligence rises to 
the level of willful blindness, it is quite likely that a court will find 
a breach of duty. 129 We would not expect educators to be liable 
for breaches amounting to simple negligence, but that liability 
for carelessness would be possible in instances where neglect of 
duty rose to the level of gross negligence or willful disregard of 
duty. 
4. Classification of the Alleged Breach 
The manner in which an alleged breach of fiduciary duty is classified 
will often have a significant effect on whether a breach of duty will be 
found and on whether that breach will be regarded as being of a high or 
low magnitude. For example, in Delaware, the state legislature adopted a 
statutory amendment to the corporate code that enables companies to 
adopt an amendment to their corporate charters that eliminates 
monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care by directors, even in 
doctor who negligently overprescribed an addictive sleeping pill and then continued to assure patient 
that he was not addicted nor being harmed constituted constructive fraud, which "requires a 
fiduciary ... relationship," because "[t)he professional's fiduciary and confidential relatiomhip with 
his client or patient both compels the professional to disclose, rather than conceal, his error and 
mitigates the injured person's duty to discover it independently" (quoting Gutierrez v. Majid, 705 
P.2d 886, 890 (Cal. 1985))). 
129. See Johnson v. Dallas Jndep. Sch. Dist., 38 !'.3d 198, 206 (5th Cir. 1994) (Goldberg,]., 
dissenting) ("The deliberate indifference standard is a high legal threshold, used to distinguish 
simple negligence from the type of willful blindness that is so extreme that it qualities as active 
conduct for determining culpability."); see also White v. Rochjord, 592 f.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(discussing liability based on gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of others). 
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the event of gross negligence. 130 This has had the effect of reducing the 
magnitude of breach associated with the duty of care. If a Delaware 
corporation has adopted such a charter amendment under Section 
1 02(b )(7), and if shareholders allege that directors have violated only 
their duty of care, the court will dismiss the complaint. On the other 
hand, in Delaware if plaintiffs provide evidence of a violation of the duty 
of loyalty, then the burden of proof shifts to the directors to establish the 
"entire fairness" of the transaction at issue, in which case the directors' 
performance with respect to all of their fiduciary duties, including the 
duty of care, will be evaluated as a part of an assessment of "entire 
fairness." In such a case, an evaluation of the directors' alleged violations 
of their duty of care will come in through the back door. Thus, in a case 
involving Delaware directors, if a Section 102(b)(7) charter amendment 
has been adopted, the fiduciary duty of care will typically only receive 
substantive review if there has been a violation of a different fiduciary 
duty. 
a. A Hierarchy of Alleged Breaches of Duty 
Not all breaches of fiduciary duty are viewed as being equally 
egregious. Most notably is the distinction between malfeasance 
(affirmative misconduct) and nonfeasance (failure to act appropriately). 
In general, a court is more likely to find liability for fiduciary conduct 
that can fairly be characterized as malfeasance as opposed to 
nonfeasance. There is something of an informal, if inexact, hierarchy of 
alleged breaches of duty, based upon the nature of the breach, with fraud 
at the top of the list of seriousness and prudence at or near the bottom. 
We would suggest that the hierarchy would run approximately as follows: 
fraud, self-dealing, disloyalty, conflicts of interest, disclosure, 
disobedience, diligence, care, and prudence. 
(i) Fraud 
The prohibition on fraudulent conduct is at or near the top of the 
hierarchy of types of breach of fiduciary duty. If a fiduciary commits 
fraud, there is a high likelihood that a court will find a breach of fiduciary 
duty.u 1 Indeed, the conduct may be covered by criminal and other civil 
130. See, e.g. Delaware Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
131. Sec e.g In re Mushroom Transp. Co., 382 F.3d, 325, 342 (3d Cir. 2004) (the court is 
especially concerned with tfaud and the fiduciary because "it is this type of very special relationship 
that enables a wayward fiduciary to engage in acts of concealment that 'cause the [principal] to relax 
vigilance or deviate from the right of inquiry"' (emphasis removed) (citing Rubin Quinn Moss 
Heaney & Patterson, P.C v. Kennel, H32 F. Supp. 922, 935 (E.D. Pa. !993))); see also Schwartz v. 
Pierucci, 60 B.R. 397, 40J (Bankr. !'.D. Pa. 1986). 
liability provisions, and so the concept of fiduciary duty may not 
explicitly be a part of the analysis of legal culpability. 132 The definition of 
fraud will vary from context to context and, in general, in areas where 
there are other indicia that would suggest the existence of high-
magnitude fiduciary duties, fraud will often be defined in a way that 
makes it easier to prove the elements of the otiense, which will have the 
effect of magnifying the prohibition of fraudulent behavior. 
(ii) Self-Dealing 
A related high magnitude breach of duty is self-dealing, or behavior 
in which the fiduciary uses the beneficiary's property for his own 
purposes, without regard for, or even contrary to, the interests of the 
beneficiary. 131 Because it is a high magnitude breach of duty, self-dealing 
is also likely to result in fiduciary liability for breach of duty. 1" 1 Self-
132. Sec e.g. Securities fxchangc Act of 1934, Rule IOb-5, 17 C.f.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004) (federal 
securities rule that prohibits making "any untrue statement of a material fact", and also prohibits 
engaging "in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person" in connection with purchase or sale of any security of any national 
securities exchange); 29 U.S.C.S. § 1105 (Ll'XIS 2005) (ERISA provision which spells out liability for 
breach by co-fiduciary, including concealing acts or omissions of other fiduciaries); 29 U.S.C:.S. § 
I lOll (LEXIS 2005) (ERISA provision that enunciates prohibited transactions by a fiduciary, 
particularly forbidding a fiduciary to deal with "assets of the plan in his own interest or li>r his own 
account"). 
133. For examples of self-dealing, sec Iemberg v. Mann, 358 F3d 131, 135 (I st Ci r. 200·1) 
(fiduciaries "[rnjay not misuse their ottlcial positions so as to harm the corporation ... in order to 
advance their personal interests, their fiduciary obligations arise from and arc bounded by the 
corporate relationship"); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John 1-i<mcock Mut. Life' Ins. Co., 302 !'.3d IH, 
32 (2d Cir. 2002) (the court referred to ERISA§ !lOll (infra n. 143), and found that the in,urancc 
company breached its tlduciary duty to avoid self-dealing because it "dealt with the assets of the plan 
in [ih] own interest," by charging itself below-market rental rates on office properties); Sw:fimi v. 
San.f(mf, 137 S.W.3d 391, 39R (Ark. 2003) (in a discussing fiduciary duties of a trustee, and citing the 
rule that "[i]n adminislt'ring the trust, the trustee must act for the beneficiaries and not f(>r himself in 
antagonism to the interest of the beneficiaries; he is prohibited from using the advantage of hi.s 
position to gain any bene lit for himself at the expense of the beneficiaries and from placing himself 
in any position where his self interest will, or may, conflict with his duties" (quoting Riegler F. 
Ricj;ler, 553 S.W.2d 37,40 (Ark. 1977))). 
134. Cases discussing self-dealing arc highly critical of any evidence of a fiduciary's acting in 
their own self interest at the expense of a corporation or beneficiary. In one case the judge slated that 
"[t]he fact that [the defendant] profited at all from the transfer of .. assets, even relatively 
minimally, indicates the self-dealing nature of the switch." O'Malley v. Boris, 2002 Del. Ch. l.EXIS 33 
at '19 n. 24 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 2002). See Hpstein v. U.S., 174 f.2d 754, 764 (nth Cir. 1949) 
(demonstrating suspicion that directors could be acting in their own interest or the intere't of one 
other companies: "[tjransactions between corporations having interlocking directorates, the f'1irness 
and good fC1i1h of which transactions are challenged, are jealously regarded by the law"); Continental 
Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., Inc., 750 A.2d 1219, 1238 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that even where a 
limited partnership ended upon profiting from the self-dealing, their disloyal, self-dealing act would 
still entitle the other partners to recover: "Delaware law docs not allow a disloyal fiduciary to protlt 
from his breach."). 
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dealing is closely related to the duty of loyalty, and sometimes self-
dealing is treated as a particularly egregious violation of the duty of 
loyalty. 135 
(iii) Disloyalty 
Also near the top of the hierarchy of breaches of fiduciary duty is 
disloyalty. Disloyalty is a high magnitude breach that is quite likely to 
result in a finding of a violation of fiduciary duty. For example, in the 
corporate context, whereas the business judgment rule protects directors 
from liability for mistakes that are made in good faith and after 
reasonable investigation, there is no analogous shield protecting directors 
from a violation of their duty of loyalty. 136 In its strongest formulation, 
the duty of loyalty requires that a fiduciary put aside his own interests 
and act in furtherance only of the interests of a beneficiary. 137 If there is 
an alignment of interests, such as in a partnership, the expectation of 
selflessness will be lower as long as the alignment of interests is 
maintained. In some contexts it is also possible to contractually lower the 
135. Not only does self-dealing lead to sanctions, but courts apply other legal remedies to help 
the beneficiaries of a self-dealing fiduciary. For example, "[t]he benefit of the statute of limitations 
will be denied to a corporate fiduciary who has engaged in fraudulent self-dealing." Laventhol, 
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 169-70 (Del. 1976). Additionally, self-
dealing is considered so serious that when there is self-dealing, courts sometimes find that there has 
been a breach of fiduciary duty "even when the act taken is innocent and unintentional." Calc v. 
Laws, 76 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Ark. 2002). Courts find that "[t]he duty of loyalty derives from the 
prohibition against self-dealing that inheres in the fiduciary relationship. The fiduciary is not to 
benefit at the expense of the corporation ... 'no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical 
requirements."' Saginaw Products. Corp. v. Cavallo, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2030 at '11 (Conn. 
Super. Aug. II, 1994) (quoting In rc Western World Funding, Inc., 53 B.R. 743,763 (Bankr. D. Nev., 
1985) (internal quotation omitted)). 
136. Although the business judgment rule holds that a court will not "second-guess" a board's 
decision, if a plaintiff shows a breach of fiduciary duty, the burden will shift to the fiduciary directors 
to prove the "entire fairness" of a transaction. Cede & Co. v. Technicolar Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 
1991 ); See Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 f.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[under normal 
circumstances the directors of a corporation may determine, in the exercise of their business 
judgment ... without review of the merits of their decisions by the courts. The business judgment 
rule places a heavy burden on shareholders who would attack corporate transactions. But the 
business judgment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of interest. When a 
shareholder attacks a transaction in which the directors have an interest other than as directors of the 
corporation, the directors may not escape review of the merits of the transaction." (citations 
omitted)) 
137. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 547 (finding that partner in joint venture "held [the business 
opportunity] as a fiduciary, for himself and another, sharers in a common venture" and describing 
the duty of loyalty as "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of honor the most sensitive" (supra n. 19 
and accompanying text)). This expression of the duty of loyalty is constantly cited by courts. See 
Lawrence v. Cohn, 197 F. Supp. 2d 16, 33-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) af/d, 325 F.3d 141 (2d C:ir. 2003); N.E. 
Gen. Corp. v. Wellington, 82 N.Y.2d 158, 162 (N.Y. 1993); British Am. Oil Producing Co. v. Midway 
Oil Co., 82 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Okla. 1938). 
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obligations associated with the duty of loyalty. uH But if a fiduciary 
expropriates a corporate or partnership opportunity for his own benefit, 
the alignment of interests will be broken, and the fiduciary that has taken 
the opportunity for himself will be in violation of his duty of loyalty. 13Y 
(iv) Conflicts oflnterest 
Closely related to the duty of loyalty are problems that arise from 
conflicts of interest. When the interests of the fiduciary and beneficiary 
diverge, special measures must be taken by the fiduciary in order to avoid 
breaching her fiduciary duty. For example, if a board of directors takes 
defensive measures to prevent an unsolicited offer to buy the company, 
due to the potential conflict of interest that exists between directors (who 
may want to perpetuate themselves in office) and shareholders (who may 
be interested in a sale at a premium of current stock price), courts often 
subject the steps taken by directors to thwart such overtures under an 
enhanced scrutiny standard. 140 When a transaction is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, a court will ask whether the board's actions were 
in response to a reasonable perception of a threat to the corporation, and 
whether the measures taken were proportional to the threat that 
existed. 141 As a further example, when a director is involved as a principal 
in a transaction with the corporation, her interests may conflict with 
138. Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 103(b)(2). When an LLC is formed, an 
operating agreement sets up the structure of the LLC. The operating agreement can be constructed 
quite broadly, but the act specifies that it may not "eliminate the duty ofloyalty" entirely.§ 103(b)(2). 
The operating agreement may, however, "identify specific types or categories of activities that do not 
violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable." Jd. at (b)(2)(i). See McConnell v. Hunt 
Sport.> Enterprises, 725 N.F..2d 1193, 1214 (Ohio App. lOth Dist. 1992) (finding no breach of duty to 
loyalty when one member separately started hockey franchise that was initially proposed to the LLC 
and stating that "[n]ormally, the presence of such a relationship would preclude direct competition 
between members of the company. However, here we have an operating agreement which by its very 
terms allows members to compete with the business of the company."). 
139. See e.g. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[A] partner has a fiduciary 
obligation to the partnership of the utmost good faith and loyalty and cannot divert a bminess 
opportunity for his own gain without first making a complete and unambiguous disclosure to the 
partnership."); Broz v. Cellular Inj(J. Syss., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996) ("a corporate officer or 
director may not take a business opportunity for his own if: (I) the corporation is financially able to 
exploit the opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within the corporation's line of business; (3) the 
corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for 
his own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the 
corporation"). 
140. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,954-55 (Del. 19R5) ([t]bc standard of 
proof ... is designed to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed 
motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders, which in 
all circumstances must be free of any fraud or other misconduct"). 
141. Id.; see also Flake v. Hoskins, 55 f. Supp. 2d 1196, 1216 (D. Kan. 1999); Gilbert v. El Paso 
Co., 575 A.2d 1 131 (Del. 1990). 
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those of the corporation, and she must fully disclose the conflict to the 
remaining disinterested members of the board and recuse herself from 
the decision making process while the disinterested board members 
decide whether the transaction is in the best interests of the 
corporation. 142 
(v) Disclosure 
A medium-level breach of duty is a violation of a fiduciary's 
obligations to disclose relevant material information to beneficiaries. The 
exact contours of the duty of disclosure vary significantly from context to 
context. 14·' Fulfilling the duty of disclosure may also involve a measure of 
judgment, since determining what information is relevant or material 
may not always be easy. 141 The duty to disclose material information 
often arises in the corporate context. For example, directors have a duty 
to disclose all material information to shareholders when soliciting 
shareholder approval for a course of action the directors are 
recommending. 145 It is quite common for disclosure failures to be linked 
to other substantive fiduciary duties, such as the duty of loyalty or the 
duty of care. If a failure to disclose material information or the disclosure 
of materially inaccurate information is the result of a breach of the 
underlying duty of care, it is less likely that liability will be found than if 
the incomplete or inaccurate disclosure is based upon a breach of the 
underlying duty of loyalty. 146 This should not come as a surprise, since 
142. Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Tnc., 77 P.3d 130, 149 (Kan. 2003) ("'t]he presence of a 
majority of outside independent directors will materially enhance such evidence [that a reasonable 
investigation determined that defensive measures are necessary]"). 
143. In some ERISA and securities cases, there is a duty to disclose any material fact that is 
connected to the fidicuiary's obligations. See Dobson v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 389 F.3d 386, 401 
(2d Cir. 2004) ("A number of authorities assert a plan fiduciary's obligation to disclose information 
that is material to beneficiaries' rights under a plan, even if such information goes beyond the four 
corners of the plan itself."). In other situations, the duty of disclosure is much more limited. See 
Monetta Fin. Scrvs. v. Sees. Exch. Commn., 390 F3d 952,957-58 (7th Cir. 2004) (in finding that there 
was no awareness of duty to disclose !PO allocations, the court emphasized that no disclosures were 
expressly required, thus disclosure was not part of fiduciary duty for personal liability). 
144. Partial disclosure can trigger full disclosure duties even with respect to information that 
by itself may not have been material. Lewis v. Bank of AmericaNA, 347 F.3d 587, 587 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(citing Union Pacific Resources Group Inc. v. Rhone, 247 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[a] duty to speak 
arises by operation of law when ... one party voluntarily discloses some but less than all material 
facts, so that he must disclose the whole truth, i.e. all material facts, lest his partial disclosure convey 
a false impression")). 
145. See Erickson v. Horing, 2002 WI. 31163611 at *14 (Minn. App. Oct. l, 2002) ("Under 
Delaware law, a director owes a fiduciary duty to 'disclose fully and fairly all material information 
within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action."' (quoting Arnold v. Socy. for Sav. 
Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270,1277 (Del. 1994))). 
146. See e.g. Johnson v. Shapiro, 2002 WL 31438477 at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2002) (holding that 
knowing or reckless withholding of material information is not shielded by Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 
loyalty is further up the hierarchy of duties than is care. Disclosure 
problems based upon disloyalty will be treated more severely than 
disclosure failures that are a result of mere carelessness. 
(vi) Disobedience 
A somewhat lower magnitude duty is the duty of obedience. The 
primary reason obedience is regarded as a less onerous duty is because 
the element of judgment and discretion is largely absent. 147 Rather, the 
expectation is that the fiduciary will follow instructions and act in a 
manner that is consistent with those instructions. In general, doing what 
one is told is less difficult than is exercising good judgment in situations 
involving complex and competing considerations. Because obedience 
places relatively straightforward obligations upon a fiduciary, when a 
fiduciary acts directly contrary to instructions given by a beneficiary, this 
is quite likely to be viewed as a breach of duty. 14x In some fiduciary 
relationships where the degree of discretion of the fiduciary is very high, 
direct questions of obedience may be unlikely. 149 On the other hand, if 
the fiduciary is given clear instructions, then the duty of obedience is 
more likely to be contested. For example, if a fiduciary is responsible for 
the management of funds and the fiduciary has been given explicit 
instructions or guidelines about the type of investments that are suitable, 
direct disobedience of instructions is quite likely to result in liability, 
especially if other indicia of degree of breach discussed above indicate a 
breach oflarge magnitude. 1511 
102(h)(7) (2001) but rather falls under a breach of the duty of loyalty). 
147. Sec Ebusco Servs., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 402 !-'. Supp. 421, 44S (E.Il. Penn. l<J75) 
(citing the Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 33 (1<J58) ("an agent is a Gduciary," and as such, must 
"obey the will of the principal as he knows it or should know it")). In Texas, the only duty of 
obedience is to act within the powers of the corporation, so in order to breach the duty of obechencc, 
it is necessary to knowingly commit '"acts beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation as 
defined by its charter."' Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bonner, I<J93 U.S. !list. LEXIS 11107, at '4-5 (S.n. 
Tex. June .l, 1993) (quoting Gearhart Indus. v. Smith, Int'l., 741 F.2d 707, 719 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
148. See e.g. Gagmm v. Coombs, 654 N.E.2d 54, 61 (Mass, App. 1995) (finding violation of 
fiduciary duty of obedience where woman who had power of attorney refused to comply with the 
principal's expressed wishes regarding property). 
149. Sec e.g. Tysor1 v. Clayton, 7R4 F. Supp. 69, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that boxing 
manager did not violate tlduciary duty by refusing to sign a promotional contract because,'" boxing 
manager, "[manager] had a more complex responsibility to his client than does an ordinary fiduciary 
to his principal ... [he was] hired to manage [boxer], a function that anticipates wmething more 
than blind obedience to the boxer's every inclination"). 
150. The scope of tiduciary duty owed by a broker for a non-discretionary trust is often fairly 
limitc·d, but courts will tlnd "a duty to properly carry out transactions ordered by the customer." 
lruicx Future's Group, Inc. v. Uoss, 557 N.E.2d 344, 34H (Ill. App. 1st ])ist. 1990). 
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(vii) Diligence 
The fiduciary duty of diligence falls somewhat lower down the 
hierarchy of fiduciary duties. Diligence is closely linked to the fiduciary 
duty of care and can be seen as a magnified version of care. 151 When 
particularly important decisions are being made, courts are more likely to 
describe the duty of care as a duty of diligence. For example, when a 
board of directors is contemplating an important transaction, such as the 
sale of the business, they are expected to exercise due diligence in making 
a decision and recommendation to shareholders. 152 The degree of care 
that will be expected of them is somewhat higher than the degree of care 
that will exist with respect to the day-to-day operations of the business, 
which are much more likely to be given broad protection by the business 
judgment rule. 151 Diligence is particularly important when discretionary 
decisions are entrusted to fiduciaries, or where large financial losses can 
accompany a failure to diligently investigate potential courses of 
action. 151 
(viii) Care 
One of the most common and basic fiduciary duties is the duty of 
care. While the duty is often described in rather lofty and demanding 
ways, in practice a rather significant breach of the duty of care is required 
151 Sec e.g In rc Blinder, Robinson & Co., 131 B.R. 872, 883 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) 
(acknowledging that law firm was honest and made full disclosures about its knowledge ofcontlict of 
interest, hut finding that a "fiduciary duty of diligence required that a member of the finn scan 
the .. register" to fulfill duty of care to eliminate possibility of conflict of interest); Rayman v. 
!'copies Sovings Corp., I<JX9 U.S. Dist. LFXIS 10920 at '10 (N.D. IlL Sept. 12, 1989). 
I ~2. Sec ,·.g Slllit!J, 4XX A.2d at 872 (In determining whether the business Judgment rule 
applied in a merger that precluded a company from soliciting bids from other companies, the court 
stated,"!, tjhc dcterrninat ion of whether a business judgment is an informed one turns on whether the 
dirL·ctor~ have informed thcmsdvc~ 'prior to making a business decision, of all n1aterial infonnation 
reasonably available to them."'). 
153. Sec e.g. Sc"IJ/cnskv v. Wrigley, 237 N. E.2d 776, 779 (IlL App. 1st Disl. 196X) (The court 
dismis."·d a derivative suit against corporation, holding that the court would not examine the 
business decision of whether the defendant should have held night games to generate more revenue. 
'"Jn a rurcly bu.siness corporation ... the authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of 
the corporalion must be regarded as absolute when they act within the law, and the court is without 
authonty tu subqitute its judgment f(lr that of the directors."' (quoting Toe/Jc/man v. Missouri-
l<cllzS<l.' i'ipc· I.ine Co., 41 F. Supp. 334,339 (D. DeL 1941), ajfd in part and reversed in part, 130 F.2d 
1016 (3d Cir. 1'!42)). J'he court merely cited fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest as reasons br the 
court to interfere with the honest business judgment in this purely business decision.). 
I ">·1. See c _g. In rc Estate of Collins, 72 Cal. App. 3d 663 (2d Disl. 1977) (holding that even where 
a sctt lor has granted an absolute discretionary trust, trustee still has a fiduciary duty to reasonably 
invcstig.11L' and gain information about investments); Francis v. United jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 
S21 22 (N.f. 1<JHOJ ("[djirectors arc under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the 
a~....-ti\·itlc-..'';. 
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before courts are likely to find legal liability. The duty of care is often 
linked to the concept of negligence. But a court is very unlikely to hold 
liable a fiduciary guilty of simple negligence. Rather, negligencE' must 
often rise to the level of gross negligence or reckless disregard of relevant 
information before liability will be found. 155 Some business forms 
affirmatively contemplate co-owners being able to contractually reduce 
the degree of care owed to each other. 156 Courts, however, are sometimes 
suspicious of such efforts at limitation if they are not the result of real 
agreement and equal bargaining power. 157 As noted above, some states in 
their corporate codes have limited or eliminated the duty of care of 
directors. 15~ Nevertheless, the duty of care is deeply imbedded in the 
equitable concept of fiduciary duty, and even in jurisdictions where the 
duty has been affirmatively limited by statute, the duty has exhibited a 
stubborn persistence. 15~ 
(ix) Prudence 
Just as the duty of diligence can be viewed as a magnification of the 
duty of care, the duty of prudence may be understood as a less 
155. See e.g. In re Provenza. 316 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2003) ("In determining whether 
a member of a member-managed LLC or a manager-managed LLC has breached a fiduciary duty to 
the LLC: and its members, the courts employ, at a minimum, a gross negligence standard and the 
business judgment rule.") (emphasis added)); Bass v. Cal Life Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 1087, 1090 (Miss. 
1991) (holding that while adjusters are not liable to insureds for simple negligence in adjusting 
claims, they can incur liability when their conduct constitutes gross negligence, malice, or reckle" 
disregard for insureds' rights). 
156. Sec e.g. Uniform Limited Liability Company Act§ 103(b)(3) (1996) (operating agreements 
may not "unreasonably reduce the duty of care" (emphasis added)); Uniform Partnership Act (1997) 
§ 103(b)(4) (partnership agreements may not "unreasonably reduce the duty of care" (emphasis 
added)). 
157. See e.g. BT-l v. Eq. Life Assurance Socy., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1406, 1412 (4th Dist. 1999) 
(holding "a limited partnership agreement cannot relieve the general partner of its fiduciary duties in 
matters fundamentally related to the partnership business"). 
L>H. See e.g. Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004); see also Thomas C. Lee, Limiting 
Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors' Duty of 
Care, Ll6 U. Pa. L. Rev. 239, 241-42 (1987); John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith" and the 
Ability of Directors to Assert §102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to 
Claims Allegirzg Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 Del. ). 
Corp. L. Ill, Ill (2004). 
159. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85,99 (Del. 2001) affd, 840 A.2d 641 (Del. 2003) 
(holding that once the threshold of a breach of duty of loyalty or good faith is shown, the burden 
shifts to directors to prove entire fairness of the transaction, and this includes a consideration of all 
fiduciary duties, including duty of care); Prod. Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.. 863 A.2d 
772, 794 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that since creditors did not approve the§ 102(b)(7) enactment, 
they should not be limited by the statute's shielding of directors fi·om duty of care in the way that 
shareholders can be limited); johnson v. Shapiro, 2002 WL 31438477 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2002) 
(holding that reckless or intentional failure to disclose material information is not shielded by § 
102(b)(7)) 
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substantive and robust version of the duty of care. When a court says that 
a fiduciary owes a duty of prudence, it is describing a very modest 
standard of care. The duty of prudence can usually be fulfilled with 
minimum procedural and substantive care. 160 
b. Significance of the Hierarchy of Breaches 
A breach of a duty at or near the top of this hierarchy of duties is 
more likely to result in legal liability than is a breach of a duty at or near 
the bottom. Thus, not only will the specific description of the alleged 
breach of duty be important, the way in which a court characterizes and 
categorizes a breach of duty will have a direct effect on the likelihood that 
legal liability will eventually be found. For example, sometimes a single 
pattern of conduct could be described as amounting to a violation of the 
duty of loyalty or the duty of care, but if a court accepts a 
characterization that emphasizes carelessness (which might be viewed as 
nonfeasance) it is less likely that the court will find liability than if the 
court characterizes the behavior as implicating the duty of loyalty (which 
is more likely to be viewed as malfeasance). Thus not only does the 
category, character, and description of a fiduciary's misconduct affect 
whether or not liability will attach, how a court chooses to categorize, 
characterize and describe a fiduciary's misconduct will telegraph how the 
court is likely to decide the case. Courts can magnify or diminish an 
alleged violation of fiduciary duty by the way in which it categorizes the 
breach. 
c. Applying the Hierarchy of Duties to Educators 
In general, we would expect that this general hierarchy of types of 
breaches of duty will apply in the educational context in a manner similar 
to other contexts. Educators who are viewed as committing fraud, 
violating their duties of loyalty, or exploiting conflicts of interest are 
much more likely to be held legally liable than fiduciaries who are 
accused of inattentiveness or imprudence. We would expect that sexual 
misconduct by teachers, especially with minors or young adults, will be 
viewed by courts as akin to a violation of the duty of loyalty or as self-
dealing, in which case such conduct will be viewed as high-magnitude 
breaches of duty with a high likelihood of legal liability. At the other end 
160. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(B) (2005) (which provides in relevant part that "a fiduciary 
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing 
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would usc in the conduct 
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."). 
[...._,V\..l..J 
of the spectrum, we would expect it to be quite unlikely that educators 
will be held liable in cases where their sole wrongdoing involves an 
alleged violation of a duty of care or prudence. 
C. The Availability of an Appropriate Remedy 
The third step in an analysis of the likelihood that a fiduciary will be 
found liable for a breach of fiduciary duty focuses upon the availability of 
an appropriate and meaningful remedy. It might seem that the remedy 
would only become a focus of consideration after a determination has 
been made that liability should attach, but in a number of cases it appears 
that courts consider whether a remedy is available as a part of their 
determination of whether liability should exist at all. This might be in 
part because a court may be reluctant to find liability when an 
appropriate remedy does not seem to exist. On the other hand, if there is 
an available and obvious remedy to an alleged breach, this may actually 
increase the likelihood that a court will find that there has been a breach 
of duty. 
A wide array of remedies are imposed in cases involving breaches of 
fiduciary duty. Similar to breaches, potential remedies seem to exist in an 
informal hierarchy based upon the degree of burden or magnitude of 
penalty placed upon the fiduciary to remedy his breach of fiduciary duty. 
At the bottom of the hierarchy would be the requirement to give an 
accounting, followed in roughly ascending order by, disclosure, 
disgorgement, recession, restitution, actual damages, an injunction, 
specific performance, removal from office, punitive damages, 
decertification, and imprisonment. 
In general, courts reserve the most severe penalties for instances of 
high magnitude breaches of high magnitude duties. So for example, 
imprisonment, decertification, and punitive damages will normally be 
reserved for severe breaches of serious duties. On the other hand, a 
remedy such as requiring an accounting or requiring a full disclosure will 
be more common in situations involving lower degree violations of lower 
degree duties. If a severe penalty is sought, a court will most likely require 
proof of a high magnitude breach and high magnitude duty. If an 
appropriate remedy does not seem to exist, this will decrease the 
likelihood that a court will find that a fiduciary relationship exists or, if 
such a relationship does exist, that there has been a breach of duty. 
IV. APPLYING THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK IN FOUR TYPES OF 
EDUCATION CASES 
The analytic framework introduced in Part III helps us understand 
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and evaluate how courts will address a wide variety of issues involving 
alleged violations of fiduciary duties by educators. When the facts of a 
particular case are evaluated against the factors that are utilized by courts 
in assessing the magnitude of duties, the magnitude of breaches, and the 
availability of an appropriate remedy, it is usually possible to ascertain 
with some confidence whether or not a court will find that there has been 
a breach of fiduciary duty. By way of illustration, we will briefly address 
four sets of recurring issues that arise in education: (i) cases involving the 
evaluation and grading of students; (ii) cases involving research 
relationships; (iii) cases involving patents and other intellectual property; 
and (iv) cases involving allegations of sexual harassment or misconduct. 
A. Academic Evaluation and Advisement 
Disgruntled students have brought a variety of lawsuits alleging 
violations of fiduciary duty by schools and universities in the grading and 
evaluation process. These cases tend to involve rather low degree alleged 
duties combined with small magnitude alleged breaches, and thus it is 
not surprising that courts have often refused even to recognize that such 
claims involve a fiduciary relationship, 161 or have concluded that the 
student has failed to prove the elements of a fiduciary relationship. 1" 2 
When a fiduciary relationship is acknowledged in the context of grading 
and evaluation, courts have uniformly found no breach of duty. 163 
161. Some courts sidestep or explicitly reject the claim that such cases involve a vinlation of 
fiduciary duty by characterizing the cases as involving assertions of "educational malpractice,'' or 
"inadequate services." Sec e.g. Ross v. Creighton U, 957 F. 2d 410, 414 n. 2 (7th C:ir. 1992) (citing 
"'"es from eleven other states that have considered and rejected educational malpractice claims); 
l'etcr W. v. S.F. Unijied Sch. JJist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855 (App. 1st Dist. 1976) (rejecting student 
claim alleging inadequate education). So classitied, courts usually follow the road of declining to 
entertain claims of educational malpractice or inadequate educational services as a matter of public 
policy. See Regents o(the U. of Mich. v.l:'wing, 474 U.S. 2!4, 226 (1985); Ross, 957 F.2d at414 (stating 
that federal courts are inapt to evaluate the substance of academic decisions made by educators on 
daily basis); Gaily v. Columbia U., 22 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dismissing student's 
cbim that school failed to provide an effective education as an "impermissible attempt to avoid the 
mle that there is no claim in New York for 'educational malpractice'"). Other courts .sidestep the 
claim that such cases involve fiduciary relationships by asserting that the relationship between the 
student and the university as strictly contractual. See e.g. Andre, 655 N.Y.S. 2d at 779; Prusack 1'. 
State, 117 A.D.2d 729, 729 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1986). 
162. In evaluation cases, courts often conclude that the student has t;,i]cd ackquatdy to prove 
that a fiduciary relationship exists. See Zumbrun v. U. of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. ·199, 506 (App. 2d 
!Jist. I '172) ("The mere placing of trust in another person does not cr-eate a fiduciary relationship"); 
Shapiro 1'. Ruttcrjicld, 921 S.W.2d. 649,651-52 (Mo. App. 1996) (holding student failed to establish 
that a liduciary relationship existed with her faculty advisor); Abrams v. Mary Washington College., 
33 Va. Cir. 449,454 (Va. Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no common law "special trust relationship" 
between students and college officials). 
lld. One tactic courts use is to reject claims based on the evaluation or grading process on the 
basis that student has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Sec e.g. Montalvo v. U. ofMiwni, 
D. 1 .U. L.LJU~l"\.llVl\1 1"\.1\ILJ Ll"\. VV JVU!'\.1\11"\.L LLVV::> 
Consider the following representative cases. 1" 4 
In Maas v. Corp. of Gonzaga University, 165 the Washington Court of 
Appeals rejected a law student's claim that her law school had a duty to 
warn her of the possibility that she might fail, and denied her request that 
the law school be ordered to grant her a law degree. This cases involves a 
low-level alleged duty (failure to warn of possible failure in law school), 166 
with a low level alleged breach (negligence on the part of the law 
school), 167 and a very demanding request for relief (ordering the law 
school to grant plaintiff a law degree). Not surprisingly, the court refused 
even to acknowledge the existence of a fiduciary duty in the case, 16x and 
noted that as a "general rule, courts will not interfere with purely 
academic decisions of a university." 16Y 
In Andre v. Pace University, 1711 a New York trial court noted that 
educators assume fiduciary duties towards students they supervise when 
it granted a student request for a tuition refund for a class in which a 
professor had incorrectly assured them that the course would not be too 
difficult for them in spite of their limited math and science 
backgrounds. 171 The case was reversed on appeal, on the grounds that the 
relationship between students and a university is contractual in nature 
and that the claim was an invalid assertion of "educational 
malpractice." 172 The court declined to engage "in a comprehensive review 
of a myriad of educational and pedagogical factors, as well as 
administrative policies that enter into the consideration of whether the 
method of instruction and choice of textbook was appropriate, or 
preferable, for a graduate level course .... "171 
705 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1998). 
164. See also id. (rejecting the claim of a graduate student who had failed his comprehensive 
oral exam that the University had breached a fiduciary duty through bias and animosity on grounds 
that student failed to provide any direct evidence that the University breached a fiduciary duty owed 
to him). 
165. Maas v. Corp. of Gonzaga U., 618 P.2d 106 (Wash. App. Div. 3 1980). 
166. The court states, "It is unreasonable to require the university to warn applicants of the 
obvious." I d. at 108. 
167. The court points out that Maas did not allege bad faith on the part of the law school in its 
refusal to accept transfer credits from another institution. Bad faith would constitute a higher 
magnitude breach than negligence. Id. at 109. The court also goes out its way to document the 
lengths to which Gonzaga Law School went in trying to accommodate Maas, noting that she was 
twice reinstated after falling below the minimum grade point average. Id. at 107-08. 
168. "The relationship of students and universities is generally contractual rather than 
confidential or fiduciary." Id. at 108. 
169. Id. at 109. 
170. 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1996). 
171. Id. at 780. 
172. ld. 
173. hi. at 779-80. 
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The outcome of Andre is what one would expect from an analysis of 
the magnitude of duty and magnitude of breach alleged in the case. The 
alleged duty is a duty to warn students of the possibility that they might 
fail if they did not have the requisite math and science backgrounds. This 
is a low level duty, and does not seem to be the type of information that a 
student would have to rely upon professors to ascertain. The alleged 
breach was an assurance by the professor that students with limited math 
and science backgrounds would be able to pass the course. This would 
seem to be at best a very low-magnitude breach of duty. Thus, the case 
combines a low magnitude duty with an alleged breach which is of a low 
magnitude. Since the duty is modest, the level of performance by the 
fiduciary does not need to be particularly high in order to clear the 
fiduciary bar. Not surprisingly, the court deferred to something akin to 
an educational judgment rule and declined to engage in a substantive 
review of the range of educational and policy factors that went into the 
university's judgment that students with a certain background could take 
the course. 
In Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington, 174 the Texas Court of 
Appeals granted summary judgment to university professors in a claim 
by a disappointed doctoral candidate who alleged that her professors' 
failure to disclose material information to her caused her to continue 
within the doctoral program and suffer damages. In this case, the plaintiff 
alleged a relatively low-level duty (a duty to inform), 175 and a relatively 
high degree breach of duty (a fraudulent misrepresentation of material 
facts). 176 This combination of low-degree duty and high-degree breach 
might result in liability if the plaintiff successfully proved fraud. 
The fraud claim rested upon a finding that the student-teacher 
relationship is a fiduciary relationship that triggered an affirmative duty 
on the part of the professors to inform the plaintiff of material facts and 
that the failure to disclose those facts amounted to a material false 
representation. 177 The court began its analysis by noting that there is no 
formal fiduciary relationship between teachers and students in a normal 
educational setting. Thus, liability in this case turned upon whether an 
informal fiduciary relationship existed based upon an unusual degree of 
trust and reliance. The court noted that "an informal relationship may 
give rise to a fiduciary duty where one person trusts in and relies upon 
174. 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. 7th Dist. 1998). 
175. The court stated that "[a] duty to speak may arise when a fiduciary relationship exists 
between parties." I d. at 691. 
176. The court notes that "silence may equate to a positive misrepresentation of material facts 
when there is a duty to speak." Id. 
177. !d. at 692. 
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another, whether the relationship is a moral, social, domestic, or purely 
personal one." 17x On the other hand, the court also observed that 
"although fiduciary relationships are based upon trust, not all 
relationships involving a high level of trust and confidence require that 
the parties act with good faith and with due regard to the interests of the 
one reposing confidence." 179 
In determining whether an informal fiduciary relationship existed in 
this situation, the court focused upon whether "influence ha[d] been 
acquired and abused," and whether the alleged fiduciary "personally 
gain [ ed] from the trust and confidence reposed by another." The court 
credited the professors' testimony that they "did their usual job duties of 
teaching, advising, and evaluating," and that the duties of Ho "were those 
usually and normally required of doctoral students." 1xo On this basis the 
court concluded that an informal fiduciary relationship did not exist and 
the professors did not have an affirmative duty to speak. Because the 
degree of power or control in this student-teacher relationship was not 
heightened, and because there was no evidence of personal gain, self-
dealing, or selfish motives on the part of the professors, the court held 
that there was no informal fiduciary relationship giving rise to a duty to 
speak. 1H1 In this case although the plaintiff alleged a high-degree breach, 
the factual basis for the allegation of fraud was very weak, and the court 
did not perceive a high magnitude breach of duty. The low-level duty 
combined with insufficient evidence of a high-level breach resulted in a 
finding of no liability for the university. 
B. Research Relationships 
An informal fiduciary relationship might arise between a student 
and a professor or university in the research environment, where a 
student may invest a high degree of trust and confidence in a teacher or 
advisor. Courts examine such relationships closely in order to determine 
the magnitude of an alleged duty and the magnitude of an alleged breach 
in claims involving research relationships. A case involving a Yale 
University doctoral candidate who alleged that his dissertation advisors 
misappropriated his research ideas and published them as their own is a 
good case in point. 
In Johnson v. Schmitz, 1x2 a graduate student at Yale University 
17S. !d. at 692. 
179. Id. 
180. ld. at 693. 
IX! Jd. 
182. 119 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Conn. 2000). 
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accused professors on his dissertation committee of stealing his ideas and 
discouraging him from pursuing them in order to allow themselves to 
misappropriate the ideas for themselves. 1 ~3 He also accused the university 
of failing to intervene to protect his interests. The district court 
analogized the relationship of a dissertation committee and a graduate 
student to that of an attorney and client. 1x4 The court noted that fiduciary 
duties could arise in new situations and stated that fiduciary relationships 
are "characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between 
the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is 
under a duty to represent the interests of the other." 1 xs 
This case involved an alleged heightened degree of duty (based upon 
the unique degree of trust and reliance placed by a graduate student upon 
his dissertation committee due to the professors' superior knowledge, 
skill or expertise), 1' 6 combined with a very high degree breach of duty 
(faculty misappropriation and plagiarism of a student's idea). 1 s~ Given 
the procedural posture of the case, the factual allegations were assumed 
to be true, and the district court denied the university's motion to 
dismiss. The outcome is not unexpected given the combination of 
heightened duty and high degree alleged breach. 
C. Patents and Inventions 
Another area with a potential combination of high degree duties and 
JHl. ill 
l R4. /d. at '!H. 
l XS. !d. at 97. 
IHh. rhe court noted that plaintiff alleges that since Yale was '"in a po,ition of l'"'"'' and 
authority' over him and 'in a position of trust and confidentiality with regard to his cduG1tion ideas 
and work product,' Yale had a fiduciary duty toward him, kscd on the 'uniquc[ness]' of the 
particular relationship between a 'graduatclcvel student and an educational institution." !d. al 97. 
The court abo noted that "Yale allegedly represented that it would safeguard its students from fcKulty 
misconduct and provide a nurturing environment f(Jr its student>." !d. at 'JH. "Plaintiff may further 
develop such fctclual iS>ues as Yale's representation of its mi>Sion towards graduate students, and 
whether or not it represented that it would take care of graduate students to the exclusion of all 
others, which could be relevant to the determination of whether Y,1lc owed a i'iduciary duty to 
Johmon." !d. 
I H7. ( ln a motion to dismiss, the court assumes the accuracy of the plaintiffs allegations, 
including that one of his professors published the student's theory as his own without nttributing the 
student. 'I he court notes that "[u[pon further fctctual development, plaintiff may be able to show that 
the· high degree of trust and confidence he placed in his professors was ju,tificd. His relatiomhip 
with ,~chmitz and Skelly [his advisors] was personal nnd individualized, and a.s his advisors, they had 
some duty to protect his interests. Accordingly, this relationship appears somewhat .lllalogous to the 
attorney-client relationship because the members of his committee were not entitled to act f(,r their 
own benefit. l'urther, Schmitz allegedly encouraged Johnson to trust him in sharing his dissertation 
idc:b, and stated that fclilurc to do so would he detrimental to Johnson's academic prospects. This act 
of L'llLouragcmcnt i~ rcleYant to the consideration whether a fiduciary n:lationship wa~ created here." 
!d. at LJH. 
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large magnitude breaches is student research that results in patentable 
inventions. There have been a number of cases in which students have 
claimed that faculty supervisors and universities have breached their 
fiduciary duty by failing to give students credit for patentable work. In 
these cases, courts examine closely the alleged magnitude of duty and 
alleged magnitude of breach. Duties may be heightened based upon the 
intense student-mentor relationships that can exist between graduate 
students and professors, and the superior knowledge and skill that may 
create heightened reliance and dependence of students upon professors. 
Breaches are also potentially large since the possibility of deception, self-
dealing, and self-enrichment on the part of professors and universities 
may exist. A pair of cases with apparently similar facts, but different 
outcomes, provides an interesting view of courts' subtlety and 
sophistication in evaluating such claims. 
In Chou v. University of Chicago, 1xx a graduate student sued a 
supervising professor claiming that the professor and the University had 
breached a fiduciary duty by fraudulently stealing patent and 
inventorship rights that belonged to her. The professor, Dr. Bernard 
Roizman, allegedly told Chou that her discoveries could not be patented, 
while at the same time filing a patent application naming himself as the 
sole inventor. 1 x~ Chou alleged fraud, a high-level breach of duty, and 
claimed that Dr. Roizman had a duty to disclose her participation in the 
invention, a rather low-level duty. Thus the case combined a relatively 
low level duty, which would not seem to require a high degree of 
performance, and a very high-level breach. In effect, the student argued 
that although Dr. Roizman did not have to do very much to fulfill his 
duties to her, he failed miserably even in performing this relatively 
modest duty, and instead engaged in affirmative wrongdoing. 
The district court, however, dismissed Chou's claim on the grounds 
that she lacked standing because she had "surrendered all her rights to 
the University under an employment agreement." 1Y11 The court of appeals 
reversed, holding Roizman liable for a breach of fiduciary duty, JYJ and 
holding the University liable under a theory of respondeat superior. 192 
The court of appeals noted that some fiduciary duties arise automatically 
from certain types of relationships, and others arise informally from 
188. 254 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 20tJI). 
189. Id. at 1353. Professor Roizman told the United States Patent and Trademark Office that 
though the discoveries were outlined in publications co-authored with Chou, she was only working 
"under his direction and supervision." !d. 
190. Id. at 1354. 
191. Id. at 1362-63. 
192. !d. at 1361. 
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special circumstances, "such as when one part justifiably places trust in 
another so that the latter gains superiority and influence over the 
former." 1 ~3 The court considered a number of factors to support its 
conclusion that a fiduciary duty existed in this situation: "disparity in age, 
education, and business experience between the parties, and the extent to 
which the 'servient' party entrusted the handling of its affairs to the 
'dominant' party and placed its trust and confidence in that party." 194 
These factors all have the effect of increasing the degree of duty in the 
case. The court also noted the element of self-dealing in Professor 
Roizman's seeking a selfish benefit at the expense of the beneficiary, 19" a 
consideration that increases the degree of breach. The court of appeals 
found liability by engaging in a process of analysis that increased the 
magnitude of duty in the case. When the duty was viewed as being of a 
higher magnitude, the court could more easily view the conduct of Dr. 
Roizman as constituting a breach of duty. 
In a subsequent case, University of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies, 1% 
the same court of appeals that granted Chou's claim did not find a breach 
of fiduciary duty in a case with superficial similarities to the Chou case. In 
VanVoorhies, the University of West Virginia sued VanVoorhies for 
failing to assign an invention to the University that Van Voorhies 
invented around the time he received his doctoral degree from the 
University, as required by University regulations. 197 Van Voorhies filed a 
counterclaim in which he alleged that Dr. James E. Smith, a professor 
with whom he worked while while in the process of attaining his 
doctorate degree violated his fiduciary duty to Van Voorhies by "inducing 
VanVoorhies to list [Smith] as a co-inventor [on an earlier patent] 
application," enabling the professor to share in the revenues from the 
patent. 19x The court distinguished the Chou case on several grounds. In 
\'an Voorhies there did not exist the same type of relationship of trust as 
in the Chou case, and that even if a relationship of trust did exist, there 
was no evidence that the professor violated that trust by inducing 
VanVoorhies to list the professor as a co-inventor of the first 
invention. 199 These factors indicate that the degree of duty was lower than 
in Chou. Also missing was the element of secrecy that existed in the Chou 
case. The court noted that Van Voorhies "participated in and acceded" to 
1\13. !d. a! 1362. 
1\l·l !d. 
195. !d. 
1%. 271l1'.3d 12HH, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
197. !d. at 1294. 
llJH. !d. a! 1299. 
I ')9. !d. at 1300. 
LLb 15. Y .U. tlJULA llUl'J Al'JU LA VV JUUKNAL lLliU) 
the joint patent application, knowing that this would mean that his 
professor would share in the proceeds under the University's patent 
policy. 2011 Thus, the magnitude of the alleged breach was also lower than 
in the Chou case. 
These two cases provide an interesting contrast. In Chou the court 
found that a fiduciary relationship existed with respect to graduate 
students and their patent applications, whereas in Van Voorhies the court 
found that a fiduciary relationship did not exist. When we consider the 
factors that contribute to a calculation of the magnitude of duty and the 
factors that contribute to a calculation of the magnitude of breach, the 
outcomes are not surprising. The magnitude of duty for the two cases 
hinges on the cause of reliance and amount of trust the student placed in 
the professor. In Chou the court noted that Roizman had assured Chou 
that he would take care to properly protect her research and inventions, 
and she trusted him to do so. In Van Voorhies however, no such element 
of elevated trust was present, as Van Voorhies had acceded to the 
decisions being made regarding his invention by jointly signing the 
patent application and assignment with Smith. The magnitude of the 
breach differs in the two cases as well. Chou claimed that Roizman 
breached his duty to her by acting in his own interest to unjustly enrich 
himself when he named himself inventor of Chou's discoveries. 201 On the 
other hand, although Van Voorhies claimed Smith had breached a 
fiduciary duty owed to him by inducing Van Voorhies to list Smith as a 
co-inventor of his first invention, the court in Van Voorhies noted that 
Van Voorhies failed to present any evidence that Smith had breached his 
duty. Rather, VanVoorhies had acceded in the decisions being made 
regarding his inventions, and was aware that Smith would be entitled to a 
share of the proceeds under the school's patent policy. 21 '2 These cases 
exhibit a high level of sensitivity to the types of consideration that have 
been identified as affecting the degree of duty and the degree of breach in 
situations where a violation of fiduciary duty is alleged. 
D. Sexual Harassment 
Claims of sexual harassment often combine a high magnitude duty 
with a high magnitude breach, so not surprisingly this is an area where 
courts have been willing to find a fiduciary relationship between 
universities and students. 201 Even in situations where courts find that the 
200. /d. 
201. Chou, 254 F.3d. at 1362-63. 
202. U. <:/ \"\. I'<L. 27S I' .3d .1l I JOO. 
201. See Schneider v. P(l'/1/(11/lil St. College., 744 A.2d 101, [(U--05 (N.H. l<i'J'J) ("In the context 
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magnitude of duty is low, sexual harassment is viewed by many courts as 
such an egregious act that the court may still find the defendant legally 
liable for breach. 
For example, in Schneider v. Plymouth State College, 204 the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire held that "in the context of sexual harassment 
by faculty members, the relationship between a post-secondary 
institution and its students is a fiduciary one."205 The Schneider case 
involved a high degree duty combined with a high degree breach of duty. 
In assessing the degree of duty, the court noted that "[s]tudents are in a 
vulnerable situation because 'the power differential between faculty and 
students ... makes it difficult for [students] to refuse unwelcome 
advances and also provides the basis for negative sanctions against those 
who do refuse."'206 The Court also observed that 
[t]he relationship between students and those that teach them is built 
on a professional relationship of trust and deference, rarely seen outside 
the academic community. As a result, we conclude that this 
relationship gives rise to a fiduciary duty on behalf of the defendants to 
create an environment in which the plaintiff could pursue her 
education free from sexual harassment by faculty members.207 
While the degree of duty to provide an educational environment free 
from professorial harassment is characterized as being high, the degree of 
breach by Professor Leroy Young was also very high. As a sophomore in 
college, Schneider enrolled in two graphic design courses taught by 
Young. Schneider decided to major in graphic design, and Young, the 
only graphic design professor at the University, became her academic 
advisor. Soon after, Young began harassing Schneider. According to the 
court, "Young's behavior included pressuring the plaintiff to accompany 
him on trips to various locations off campus, kissing her, sending her 
flowers, taking off her shirt, and placing her hand on his genitalia. 
Young's conduct escalated to the point that ... he completely disrobed in 
of sexual harassment hy faculty members, the relationship between a post-secondary institution and 
its studenb is a fiduciary one."); Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual H<uassment and Higher Education, 65 
Tex. L Rev. 525, 552 (19R7) (descrihing faculty-student relationships as a fiduciary relationship); But 
sec Williamson v. Bernstein, 5 Mass. !.. Rptr. 94 (Mass. Super. 1996) (holding that professor who 
offered therapy sessions to student without qualification or authorization and engaged in sexual 
relationship with student did not breach fiduciary duty and university did not breach fiduciary duty 
by failing to investigate professor's conduct). 
204. Schneider, 744 A.2d 101. 
205. Jd. at 104. 
206. Td. at 104, quoting Bogart & Stein, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Education, 
64 Peabody). Educ. 146,157 (1987). 
207. Jd. at 106. 
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his office while the plaintiff was working on his computer."2°K When 
Schneider attempted to rebuff Young's advances, "he would become 
angry, yell at her, and threaten to make her life very difficult. Young 
withheld academic support for her academic work and ridiculed her in 
front of faculty. He also gave the plaintiff a grade of 'C-' for her work as 
in intern at a graphic design company without ever consulting with her 
supervisor at the company."209 A number of professors had various 
degrees of knowledge of the harassment, but no action was taken until 
after Schneider had graduated. The combination of a duty that is 
characterized as being of a high magnitude and the breach of duty, which 
was of a very high magnitude, resulted in a holding that a fiduciary duty 
existed and an affirmation of the jury's finding that there had been a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
Williamson v. Bernstein, 2111 provides a striking contrast to Schneider. 
In Williamson, a female student brought claims of negligence against her 
professor Alan Bernstein, Fitchburg State College, and the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, claiming that Bernstein had 
negligently provided educational and therapeutic counseling services and 
induced her to have a sexual relationship with him. The Massachusetts 
court dismissed the claims against the college and commonwealth for 
breach of fiduciary duty due to the fact that even if Williamson were to 
prove that a fiduciary relationship existed with Bernstein, his 
"undertaking to provide therapeutic services and engaging in sexual 
relations . . . does not give rise to a fiduciary relationship between 
[Williamson] and the College" because he was not acting within the 
scope of his duty as a professor.211 
It may be that the outcomes in this case and the Schneider case are 
simply irreconcilable, except based upon different policy conceptions 
about the scope of employment and the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
After all, Professor Young's behavior appears to have been no more 
within the scope of his employment than Professor Bernstein's behavior 
was. The opinions in the two cases, however, do suggest that there may 
have been some additional differences. Williamson's claim was based 
upon allegations of negligence, a relatively low-level duty, whereas the 
alleged duty in the Schneider case was a higher magnitude affirmative 
duty to create an educational environment free from sexual harassment 
by faculty members. The court's characterization of the degree of duty in 
the Schneider case was much higher than even the plaintiffs 
20R Id. at 103. 
209. Id. at 104. 
210. Williamson v. Bernstein, 5 Mass. L. Rep. 94 (Mass. Super. 19'16). 
211. !d. at 110. 
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characterization of the duty in the Williamson case. In addition, the court 
in Schneider based the magnitude of fiduciary duty upon the uniqueness 
of the relationship that occurs when a student enrolls in the college, thus 
becoming dependent upon the school for her education, and "requiring 
them to act in good faith and with due regard for [her] interests."212 In 
contrast, the Williamson court asserts that Williamson "does not allege 
that she placed any trust or confidence in the College for any particular 
purpose so as to create a fiduciary relationship .... "213 The magnitude of 
breach in Williamson was also arguably lower than the magnitude of 
breach in Schneider. For example, it appears that the Massachusetts court 
did not view Williamson as being as vulnerable and trusting as the New 
Hampshire court viewed Schneider as being. Whereas Schneider is 
described as a nineteen-year-old college sophomore subject to unwanted 
sexual advances of a sexual predator who had harassed multiple students, 
Williams is described as a mother of two children who engaged in a 
consensual affair with her professor after complaining to him that "her 
husband did not understand her or her problems .... "214 In any event, 
the cases illustrate the importance of the manner in which the magnitude 
of the degree of duty and the magnitude of the degree of an alleged 
breach of duty is characterized in cases of this nature. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Assertions that educators have fiduciary duties continue to be 
controversial. The teacher-student relationship is not a "formal fiduciary 
relationship," but a number of courts have held that this relationship 
rises to the level of an "informal fiduciary relationship" in a variety of 
contexts and circumstances. If a case of alleged breach of fiduciary duty 
in the educational context is analyzed against the framework for 
quantifying the magnitude of an alleged duty and the magnitude of an 
alleged breach outlined in this article, educators, supervisors, attorneys 
and judges will be able to assess reliably the likelihood that an educator 
or educational institution will, and should, be found by a court to have 
violated his or her fiduciary duties to students, as well as the probable 
severity of remedy that the court would impose. 
212. Schneider, 744 A.2d at 105. 
213. Williamson, 5 Mass. L. Rep. at 95. 
214. Williamson, 1996 Mass. Super. LEX1S 673 at '3. 
